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Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview
Paul L. Joskow
Roger C. Noll
During the past twenty-five years the amount of research on the economics
of government regulation has increased enormously. The study of public-
policy approaches to problems in industrial organization was once
limited almost exclusively to antitrust policy and the regulation of a few
industries with natural monopoly characteristics. This area of inquiry has
been transformed as new administrative agencies with powers to set
prices, restrict entry, and control what products are produced, and how,
have come to affect the efficiency of industrial markets and the distribution
of production and income throughout the economy.
The increased attention to the economics of administrative regulation
is due to a number of factors. First, research has benefited considerably
since the late 1950s from the application of modern statistical analysis
and the mathematics of constrained optimization. Although technically
unsophisticated by contemporary standards, the classic works by Averch
and Johnson (1962), Caves (1962), Meyer et al. (1959), and Stigler and
Friedland (1962) represent a watershed in the study of economic regula-
tion by administrative agencies. What economists now know about the
effects of government regulation on economic activity that they did not
know twenty years ago is, for the most part, attributable to the kinds of
analytical techniques that were first used in a handful of classic papers
such as these.
A second reason for the expansion of scholarly interest in this area
is the increasing importance of administrative regulation in the U.S.
economy. Regulation spread to more and more sectors of the economy,
and the relative importance of such heavily regulated sectors as transpor-
tation, energy, and telecommunciations has also increased. The impact
of environmental, safety, and health regulations cuts across the entire
economy. It is now almost impossible to study any important industrial
market in the U.S. economy without taking account of the effects of
the many restrictions on the behavior of economic agents that have been
established and are administered by one or more regulatory agencies.
Third, economists have had to come to grips with important contra-
dictions between theoretical prescriptions to remedy market imperfec-Joskow and Noll 2
tions so as to increase economic welfare and the actual behavior and
performance of regulatory agencies. Implementation of theoretical
schemes designed to ameliorate market imperfections has often proved
to be difficult and costly, and the regulatory process has often created
its own imperfections. In addition, what regulatory agencies attempt to
do and how they go about it are influenced by political and bureaucratic
processes which economists rarely, if ever, considered in suggesting
regulatory policies to deal with market imperfections.
We have been asked to begin this compendium by presenting an
overview of the large and rapidly expanding scholarly literature on
regulation. An initial reluctance to engage in such an endeavor has been
replaced by the conviction that a critical overview of this literature is
especially appropriate at this time. No comprehensive review of the
recent literature exists in any easily available form. For anyone interested
in the field—especially students—this makes life fairly difficult. More
important is the possibility that research on the economics of regulation
may well be at a crossroads. In particular, applying the traditional
theoretical and empirical tools to study the traditional regulated industries
has reached the point of rapidly diminishing returns. In some cases
strong qualitative results have emerged. Additional research can refine
the quantitative significance of these results, but it is not likely to change
any basic conclusions about the effects or desirability of government
regulation. In other areas, the traditional tools have not yielded strong
quantitative results, and there is little hope that they will. In these areas
new conceptual tools and empirical techniques appear necessary if
significant progress is to be made. Research on regulation may be at a
crossroads on an even more basic level, in that changes are taking place
in the perspective from which scholars ask questions about regulation.
Most of the empirical literature on regulation is motivated by some
variant of the question of regulation versus deregulation: Is regulation
socially desirable? A negative response implies reliance on a real or
imaginary free market. In our opinion, very few situations in which
there is a clear "yes" or "no" answer to this question have not already
been well worked over, and even these are sufficiently similar to those
that have been exhaustively studied that the results of the studies can be
easily generalized to them.
Many areas of research in which there are few clear theoretical or
empirical results also cannot effectively be attacked by comparing regu-
lation with the absence of regulation, because a completely unregulated
market is not a viable, practical alternative. The issues in these areasTheory and Practice: Overview 3
often involve problems of evaluating different regulatory instruments,
regulatory processes, and extents of regulation, and determining the
distribution of costs and benefits throughout the population that results
from a particular set of regulatory activities. Indeed, even in cases in
which there is a clear case for deregulation, distribution must be explored
to make the case in the political arena as well as to structure a politically
acceptable transition from a regulated to an unregulated state.
We shall develop these arguments further in this article. The bulk of
the discussion is devoted to the original assignment: a summary and a
critical evaluation of the more important areas of contemporary research
on the economics of regulation. We supplement this discussion with
some suggestions and speculations about promising directions for future
research in regulatory economics. No attempt is made to cover everything
that might reasonably be included under the heading of regulatory
economics. Our focus is on regulatory activities conducted by adminis-
trative agencies, either independent or within the executive branch of
government, that have been delegated regulatory responsibility by
statute. We exclude antitrust policy and regulatory activities administered
directly by the courts (such as property law, liability law, and contract
law). These policy instruments are alternatives to administrative regula-
tion, for they define the basic institutional context in which a market, free
from administrative regulation, operates. It is in this context that we
believe these instruments should be evaluated, and the task of doing so is
well beyond the scope of this paper.
Government Regulation of Industry: An Overview
Studies of regulation, whether theoretical or empirical, normally fall into
three areas: price and entry regulation in industries with competitive
market structures, price and entry regulation in monopolistic industries,
and (for want of a better term) "qualitative" regulation, which attempts
to cope with various kinds of market-failure problems that are only
indirectly linked to prices, profits, and market structure. In the third
category are environmental, health, occupational-safety, and product-
quality regulation. We shall examine the research results in each of these
areas separately. In addition, no overview of this field would be complete
without considering theories of regulation that seek to answer very
general questions about the behavior of regulatory agencies as a class of
government institutions. This section concludes with a review of various
theories of regulation.Joskow and Noll 4
Price Regulation in Industries with Competitive Market Structures
If economics has any scientifically settled issues, one is surely that price
and entry regulation in perfectly competitive industries generates econom-
ic inefficiencies. As a theoretical matter, the result is trivial: Under
standard neoclassical assumptions about human motivation, frictionless
markets, and production technologies, an externally imposed constraint
upon the actors in an otherwise perfectly competitive market can do no
better than leave the market as efficient as it was before the constraint
was imposed. And, because implementing the constraint must consume
some resources, society must always operate more efficiently if a
competitive market is simply left alone.
The contribution of the literature on regulating competition is that the
data confirm the theory in several key economic sectors that nearly all
nations attempt to regulate. Economic research has demonstrated con-
vincingly that price and entry regulation in agriculture (an industry we
shall henceforth ignore, because of our ignorance about the research on
it), transportation, and oil and natural-gas production creates economic
inefficiencies. Usually this inefficiency is manifested in higher prices,
higher production costs, and slower technological progress than would
occur without regulation. In a few instances, such as regulation of
hydrocarbon fuels, the inefficiency is created by prices that are too low
to clear markets, which leads to inefficient patterns of commodity
utilization.
In the 1960s, the standard approach to estimating the inefficiencies of
regulating competition was to compare equilibrium prices, costs, and
quantities in regulated and unregulated situations. These comparisons
could be based upon direct observation when unregulated and regulated
markets operated simultaneously, or when relatively recent changes in
the nature of regulation permitted easy intertemporal comparisons.
Examples of research of this type include the analysis by Snitzler and
Byrne (1958, 1959) of the agricultural exemption in trucking, the study
by Joskow (1973b) of state regulation of property and liability insurance,
the research by Stigler (1971) on occupational licensing, MacAvoy's (1973)
and Pindyck's (1974) studies of the effects of imposing natural-gas
field-price regulation, the comparisons of interstate and California
intrastate airline service by Levine (1965), Jordan (1970), and Keeler
(1972), and the study of gas pipelines by MacAvoy and Noll (1973).
Montgomery's 1978 examination of FEA controls of petroleum applied
the same approach to a more recent regulatory development. Each of
these studies found that efficiency losses due to regulation were large inTheory and Practice: Overview 5
proportion to total transactions in regulated markets. Owing to their base
in relatively recent empirical information, these studies have to be taken
seriously in current debates about public policy. For example, the
Interstate Commerce Commission (1976) felt called upon to attempt a
formal rebuttal of a study by Moore (1975) that was based upon the
same methods and some of the same data as the Snitzler and Byrne
papers.
One difficulty with the comparative approach to studying the effects
of regulation is that, in some instances, regulation has been in force for
so long that studies of the effects of the imposition of regulation or of un-
regulated markets have questionable current quantitative value. MacAvoy
(1956) and Spann and Erickson (1970) examined the effects of the early
actions of the ICC on railroad prices and identified efficency losses of
the same sort that more recent studies have found in airlines, trucking,
and hydrocarbon fuels. However, such studies have less immediacy in
current policy debates, because of the impossibility of directly extrapolat-
ing findings from the 1880s into the present. Ideally, we would like to
have matched samples of contemporary regulated and unregulated firms
to enable us to make clear comparisons between regulated and unregulated
industry behavior and performance. Unfortunately, we rarely have this
opportunity. Often, lacking data on unregulated firms, we must infer
what the unregulated industry would look like.
Several studies, beginning with Meyer et al. (1959), have attempted
to infer the inefficiencies of existing ICC regulation solely from data
dealing with regulated operations, without the benefit of comparisons
between regulated and unregulated states of the world. One feature of
regulated competition has been that regulators have tended to set prices
on the basis of uniform formulas for particular categories of service that
apply across several firms and markets. Because regulators apparently
are loath to take actions to weed out inefficient operations, these prices
are usually set high enough so that considerable variability in the cost of
providing service can be observed among economically viable firms and
technologies. Thus, one approach to estimating the cost of regulation is
to measure the cost penalty associated with the protective price umbrella
that regulators constructs for the inefficient. For example, Meyer et al.
(1959), Friedlaender (1969), and Harbeson (1969) argued that one cost
of ICC regulation is a misallocation of freight transport among competing
modes. They estimated its magnitude by comparing the cost of shipping
different categories of commodities various distances by competing
modes. A conceptually similar approach was taken by MacAvoy andJoskow and Noll 6
Sloss (1967) and Gellman (1971) in arguing that ICC price-setting policies
and formulas had prevented or retared warranted cost-reducing innova-
tions such as the unit train, the "Big John" hopper car, and truck-rail
piggybacking.
Until about 1970, the studies that have been discussed so far were
generally regarded as providing relatively good quantitative estimates of
the costs of regulating a variety of markets with competitive market
structures. But all of these studies share the assumption that the nature
of a regulated industry's product is homogeneous. Although variable
product quality was mentioned in several earlier studies (notably, Caves
1962 and Eads 1972), Douglas and Miller (1974) (for airlines) and Boyer
(1977) and Levin (1978) (for surface transportation) demonstrated that
this assumption could lead to overestimation of the cost of price regula-
tion. A key observation is that regulatory agencies are more effective in
controlling prices than in establishing the quality of service offered by a
regulated firm. As a result, in multifirm regulated markets the firms
compete by varying the quality of service. In the airline industry this
takes the form of competition in flight frequency, choice of aircraft, and
(where not controlled directly) service amenities such as meals, seat
width, and lounge facilities. Competition in dimensions other than price
leads to excessive service quality, and therefore to higher average costs
and prices, while continually driving earned rates of return to competitive
levels.
The analytical treatment by Douglas and Miller (1974), Eads (1975),
and DeVany (1974) of competitive rivalry where minimum prices are
fixed has widespread potential application. The general point is that
prices, costs, and price-cost margins in a regulated multifirm market
cannot give a correct measure of the inefficiency caused by regulation
because service quality is lower in unregulated markets. One must
evaluate the price-quality combination and compare it with the optimum
in order to estimate the cost of regulation. This general insight is applicable
to other examples of multifirm regulation, such as trucks, taxis, insurance,
banking, and occupational licensing. Ideally, with observations on
regulated and unregulated firms, cost could be estimated relatively easily
by comparing price, cost, and quality outcomes in the two markets. An
example is the common comparison of interstate airline markets regulated
by the Civil Aeronautics Board with similar unregulated routes in Cali-
fornia and Texas. Unfortunately, in many industries such comparisons
cannot be made, and the regulated price, cost, and quality equilibrium
must be inferred from simulations of competitive equilibrium.Theory and Practice: Overview 7
Boyer (1977) and Levin (1978) recognized the importance of product
quality in measuring the costs associated with the misallocation of freight
among competing transport modes due to price regulation. Both argued
that the relative-cost approach of Meyer et al. (1959) and subsequent
studies leads to serious overestimation of the amount of traffic that is
not now shipped by the least costly mode. The relative-cost method
overlooks important differences in the attributes of service quality among
modes. Boyer and Levin concluded that intermodal substitution possi-
bilities are far more limited than the previous studies had implicitly
assumed, and cited as evidence the small price elasticities of demand that
they estimated from econometric models of the freight-transport sector.
Their studies led to estimates of the cost of intermodal misallocation of
freight resulting from price regulation that are an order of magnitude
lower than estimates based on relative-cost studies.
Unlike the studies of the airline industry that deal with service quality,
Boyer's and Levin's retained the assumption that service quality is
exogenous to regulation. A next step in this line of research is to attempt
to determine whether regulation affects the relative service qualities of
freight-transportation modes, and, in particular, whether the structure of
regulation has caused part of the spread in service quality among compet-
ing modes. If so, the true cost of price regulation would lie somewhere
between the estimates derived from the relative-cost approach, which
implicitly assumes that the modes are perfect substitutes, and the
calculations provided by Boyer and by Levin.
Relaxing the implicit assumption that product quality is invariant with
respect to changes in regulation creates difficult theoretical and empirical
problems. The likelihood that quality of service has more dimensions
in surface freight transport than in passenger air transport makes the
required theoretical and empirical analysis more difficult. The problem
is greater still in other sectors, for in transportation the most important
facets of service quality have to do with speed, frequency of service, and
freight-damage rates, all of which are easier to model and to quantify
than are the elements of quality that are important in other sectors of the
economy. Endogenizing quality may be important in numerous competi-
tive regulated markets in which the dimensions of quality are more
ephemeral and the task of the research scholar in estimating the effects
of regulation is therefore exceptionally difficult.
Nevertheless, new research along these lines is unlikely to change the
conclusions of economists about the wisdom of subjecting competitive
industries to price and entry regulation. In many cases, variable productJoskow and Noll 8
quality is not a potentially important issue. Hydrocarbon fuels, for
example, are relatively homogeneous; moreover, regulation attempts (not
completely successfully) to account for physical differences in the com-
position of fuels from different sources. In cases in which quality is
potentially important, more sophisticated research will change numerical
estimates of the cost of regulation; however, in the absence of a case for
regulatory interventions designed to affect quality directly, regulation can
only lead to a departure from efficient combinations of price, quality,
cost, and output. In an era when economists are often accused of being
unable to agree on anything, we find comfort in the virtually unanimous
professional conclusion that price and entry regulation in several multifirm
markets is inefficient and ought to be eliminated.
In light of the surprising consensus among economists about the
appropriate direction for public policy in a number of important indus-
tries with competitive market structures, the question remains why efforts
to eliminate price and entry controls have met with such stiff resistance.
Gradual deregulation of interstate airline rates and entry was accom-
plished after years of debate. Deregulation of surface freight trans-
portation has faced much stiffer resistance, as have similar efforts in
telecommunications. To most regulatory economists, "regulatory reform"
means the elimination of regulation in these markets, and the failure of
public officials to move quickly in response to these findings is a great dis-
appointment that leads to skepticism about the policy impact of economic
research. We believe that there are a number of reasons why the economic
analyses of these industries has not helped as much as it might have in
advancing the cause of regulatory reform. But we also believe that the
concerns about the impotence of economic analysis in affecting regula-
tory reform reflect a misperception of the application of scholarly research
to the implementation of public policy.
Two basic problems invariably arise in the political debate over major
changes in regulatory policy. First, with any major change in government
regulation that has important impacts on price, market structure, cost,
and product quality, some groups will gain while others lose. On balance,
economics research provides a strong case that the financial benefits to
those who gain will exceed the cost to those who lose. But, lacking some
type of compensation scheme, those who expect to lose are likely to
resist a change in policy. If the gainers are widely dispersed and the losers
are well organized, the stage is set for the losers to mount an effective
political campaign against reform. When it is unclear who is to gain and
who is to lose, and how much money is involved, it may become evenTheory and Practice: Overview 9
easier for the losers to magnify the extent of the potential losses and their
distribution. The uncertainty associated with the distribution of gains
and losses is compounded by the inherent uncertainty associated with
deriving the outcome of deregulation from inference rather than com-
parison. Unfortunately, economists have devoted little if any considera-
tion to the distribution of costs and benefits associated with existing
regulations and proposed regulatory reform. Research on the distribu-
tional consequences of deregulation would facilitate the development of
workable compensation schemes that would allow an effective political
consensus to emergy. Such research would also undermine the ability of
the losers to convince others (or their repressentatives) that they will
lose too.
The second problem concerns the transition between regulated and
unregulated states of the world. Most economic analysis compares
long-run equilibria. But legislators, who are naturally cautious about
making major policy changes in key sectors of the economy, are going
to look carefully at the short-run response to the elimination of regulatory
controls. The greater the inefficiency associated with prevailing regulatory
instruments, the greater the likelihood that severe short-run economic
dislocations will arise from their elimination. Such short-run dislocations
could easily abort a regulatory reform program before it had a chance
to achieve a long-run equilibrium. Again, economists have done little
research on the dynamic characteristics of transition from a regulated
to an unregulated regime. Such research would alert policymakers to the
possibility of important short-run industry behavior and performance,
as well as contributing to policies that might make the transition smoother
and more politically acceptable.
Although further research on the incidence of regulation and deregu-
lation and the nature of the transition path between a regulated and an
unregulated regime would add useful information to the policy debate,
it is ridiculous to place the burden of proof for regulatory reform on the
shoulders of academic economists. Economists can provide an analytical
and empirical framework in which the issues can be discussed sensibly,
help to identify potential gainers and losers, and suggest transition
schemes to smooth out short-run economic dislocations. And they can,
of course, make all this information freely available to the public by
publishing it. What academic economists can do beyond this is severely
limited.
From this perspective, academic research on regulation in industries
with competitive market structures has had an important impact. It hasJoskow and Noll 10
been used extensively by congressmen and the executive branch in the
debates on airline deregulation, trucking deregulation, telecommuni-
cations policy, and many other regulatory issues. Though such research
has not made and will never make the case on its own, it has made an
important contribution to elevating the level of public discourse in
numerous policy arenas.
Price Regulation of Monopoly
The economics literature is ambivalent about the desirability of regulating
monopolies. Because economic theory is firm in concluding that mono-
polies create economic inefficiency, social intervention to prevent, undo,
or control monopoly is potentially attractive. However, because social
interventions generate direct and indirect costs through the peculiar
kinds of inefficiencies they cause, attempting to deal with monopoly
may be at least as costly as leaving it alone. One of the more embarrassing
features of the literature on economic regulation is that, after a century
of trying, the profession is still unable to reach a consensus on what,
to an outsider, must appear to be one of the best-defined and most
central issues on which economists ought to have something to say.
Where progress has been made, it has generally been in response to an
examination of the effects of alternative regulatory mechanisms and in
the development of schemes to make price regulation more effective.
Whereas the study of regulated competition has produced essentially
one interesting theoretical development—the models of quality compe-
tition when prices are set above the competitive level—several interesting
microtheoretic developments have come from the study of the regulated
monopoly firm. We shall examine three of these.
The A-J Model The so-called A-J literature began with the seminal
work of Averch and Johnson (1962) and, in our opinion, culminated in
a series of papers by Klevorick (1971, 1973). The A-J models examine
a monopoly firm that produces output via a neoclassical production
technology using two resources: capital and labor. The firm is assumed
to seek to maximize some objective, usually profits. A regulatory com-
mission comes into the picture by imposing a constraint on the firm's
behavior. It is normally assumed that the firm is constrained to earn
on its capital stock some "fair" rate of return that is greater than the
cost of capital but less than the unconstrained, profit-maximizing rate
of return. Implicitly, the objective of the regulatory commission is assumed
to be to keep earned rates of return no higher than the allowed rate ofTheory and Practice: Overview 11
return. The primary result of the basic model is that such a constrained
firm will produce output at greater than minimum cost. In particular,
the expansion path of the constrained firm traces a locus of capital-labor
ratios that is higher than a cost-minimizing producer would use.
Extensions of the basic A-J model have included the examination of
different firm objective functions and different types of regulatory
constraints (Bailey and Malone 1970). Not surprisingly, changing the
nature of the objective and the constraints alters the basic conclusion.
Because a firm can never do better than minimize cost, changing the
model either changes the size or the direction of the production ineffi-
ciency or returns the firm to the cost-minimizing expansion path. As a
result, most work continues to be based on the assumptions of profit
maximization and a binding rate-of-return constraint.
Some richness has been added to this model by consideration of the
intermittency of regulatory review. A number of attempts to introduce
"regulatory lag" into the model have been made. These models normally
assign an active (deterministic or probabilistic) role to the regulatory
agency. During the "lag" period, the firm is allowed some relaxation
of the regulatory constraint (depending on the particular model) but
the regulatory commission is always ready to pounce on the firm to
force its earned rate of return back to the allowed rate. Such pouncing
may occur at set intervals or probabilistically according to some proba-
bility distribution known to the firm (Bailey and Malone 1970; Bailey
and Coleman 1971; Klevorick 1973).
The welfare implications of rate of return regulation are examined in
papers that seek to determine the optimal fair rate of return (Klevorick
1971; Sheshinski 1971). In these models, the optimal rate of return is
derived by replacing the maximization of profit by some social-welfare
objective. The idea is then to pick the allowed rate of return that yields a
constrained welfare maximum. Klevorick (1971), Bailey (1973), and
Sheshinski (1971) indicated that some regulation of natural monopoly
will always be optimal. This strain of the literature is important because
it recognizes that cost minimization cannot be the only criterion for
judging a regulatory system. If it were, society would be satisfied with
no regulation, because a neoclassical monopoly firm uses its inputs
efficiently.
The A-J explanation for the metafact that regulated monopolies
appear to be excessively capital-intensive industries has become conven-
tional fare in the economics literature. Whether the predictions of the
model are verified by reality is an empirical question that we shall discussJoskow and Noll 12
below; however, eschewing Freidman's methodological advice, we shall
offer some opinions on the assumptions and structure of the model,
some of which appear in the work of Joskow (1973a, 1974). The A-J
results depend on several assumptions that are at variance with the
reality of the world of regulated monopoly. Some of these are the standard
assumptions of microeconomic models, such as the existence of a con-
tinuously differentiable production function, factor and product market
prices that are certain, and homogeneous inputs and outputs with
exogenously determined characteristics. Other assumptions pertain to
the nature of the regulatory process itself, and it is these that we wish
to examine more fully.
First, the regulatory agency is assumed to regulate profits only;
however, what regulators actually do is regulate prices. The calculation
of an allowed profit is a way station along the road to determining how
much of an increase in prices will be allowed. Once set, the regulated
firm's prices—not its rate of return—are fixed, pending subsequent
regulatory review (except for the effects of automatic-adjustment clauses).
This fact has important implications for the behavior and performance
of regulated firms and regulatory agencies when costs and demand
conditions are changing rapidly and there is regulatory lag.
Second, the A-J model ignores the fact that one of the issues in a
regulatory proceeding is the determination of allowed costs. Although,
admittedly, a regulatory agency is unlikely to be sufficiently expert and
to have enough data to exercise very close scrutiny of management
decisions in a regulated firm, the agency does review the expenditures
and investments of the firm and has the power to identify and disallow
costs associated with serious production inefficiencies.
Third, the A-J model implicitly assumes that the planning horizon for
capital investments is short in comparison with the interval between
regulatory reviews, or at least that the outcome of regulatory reviews
is sufficiently predictable over the investment-planning horizon that the
firm can select an appropriate investment plan in response to it. In fact,
the time spent in constructing a major capital investment is often several
times as long as the time between regulatory reviews. A firm's ability
to respond quickly to unanticipated changes in the regulatory constraint
is, as a result, quite limited. Moreover, the A-J-model literature presumes
that the frequency of regulatory reviews is exogenous to the firm. As
Joskow (1973a) pointed out, the profits of the firm are an important
cause of regulatory review: Low profits and rising nominal costs lead
a firm to ask for a price increase, or (less frequently) declining nominalTheory and Practice: Overview 13
costs and growing profits cause the regulator or an intervenor to review
the performance of a firm in search of a justification for a price reduction.
Only when the firm is near the profit rate at which it expects to trigger
a regulatory review will it have an incentive to produce inefficiently,
for otherwise any increase in profits that is due to a cost reduction will
be retained by the firm. Obviously, the fact that actions by the agency
and by the firm depend on actions taken by the other introduces the
possibility of strategic behavior by both.
In the mid-1970s several empirical tests of the A-J model appeared
in the literature. All dealt with the electric utility industry. One (Boyes
1976) found no evidence of the capital-intensivity bias, but the result is
suspect because the author tested the A-J hypothesis by examining
capital-fuel ratios of new generating plants during the electrical conspiracy
of the late 1950s. Spann (1974), Courville (1974), and Peterson (1975),
using data from other periods, all found inefficiently capital-intensive
generation equipment and concluded that the A-J effect had been con-
firmed. McKay (1976) showed that the conclusions of these studies are
unjustified. Peterson's finding that unregulated firms spend relatively
less on capital for electricity generation is explained by the fact that
most of the unregulated firms in his sample used facilities that burned
natural gas, while most of his regulated firms burned other fuels. What
Peterson was actually measuring was the lower capital costs of gasburning
generators and the consequences of interstate price regulation of gas.
Boyes, Courville, and Spann all misspecified the nature of the tradeoff
between capital and fuel by using expenditures, rather than energy
efficiency, as the measure of capital. McKay found that when the appro-
priate measure of the efficiency frontier between equipment design and
fuel consumption is used, the A-J effect can no longer be detected.
Negative empirical findings do not disprove the A-J hypothesis, for
excessively capital-intensive processes could be introduced in many ways
other than through the substitution of thermodynamic efficiency for
fuel. Nevertheless, in light of the comments already set forth about the
extent to which the model incorporates real aspects of the decision
problem facing regulated firms, we believe that further empirical work
to test the A-J theory (especially studies limited to the electric utility
industry) is unlikely to be very productive. In our view, the A-J model
is useful primarily in illustrating the implications of one approach to
regulating monopolies. The model is interesting not because it represents
the way monopolies actually are regulated, but because it calls attention
to the value of attempting to represent institutional arrangements in aJoskow and Noll 14
formal microtheoretic model for the purpose of determining the incentive
structure that such arrangements create. Recent efforts by state utility
commissions to monitor utility supply decisions more closely recognize
implicitly that rate-of-return regulation may produce incentives that
lead a firm to depart from least-cost production in a variety of ways,
especially in the current economic environment.
A potentially fruitful line of theoretical inquiry is to formulate models
that more faithfully represent the regulatory process. For example,
Burness et al. (1980) have formulated a model in which a firm faces
a price fixed by the regulator, a requirement to serve all comers, and
upper and lower bounds on its rate of return that, when reached, trigger
a costly regulatory process that resets prices. This model is intended to
capture some of the properties of the regulatory process suggested by
Joskow (1974). (See also Hendricks 1975.) Because their model is moti-
vated by questions about the risk-taking propensities of regulated firms,
Burness et al. examine only one issue: the attitudes of a regulated firm
toward the selection between a negotiated fixed-price contract and a
cost-plus contract for constructing new capital facilities. They find that
the Joskow model reaches the opposite conclusions as the A-J model:
In the A-J world firms pick the fixed-price contract, while in the Joskow
world they opt for cost-plus. Burness et al. then examine the history of
nuclear steam systems, and find that sales of nuclear power plants
increased substantially when the manufacturers switched from a fixed-
price system to a cost-plus system, although there are reasons other
than the effects of regulation why the switch may have occurred. In any
case, this paper is a step along a path that has not been much traveled,
and one that holds some hope of shedding substantial light on the
efficiency of the production and market decisions of regulated monopolies.
Sustainability of Natural Monopoly Beginning with the paper by
Faulhaber (1975), economists at New York University and Bell Labs
have published a series of interesting papers that deal with a fundamental
issue concerning the regulation of natural monopoly: whether optimal
(second-best) prices (or, for that matter, any set of prices that cover
total costs) can prevent entry into the market of a regulated natural
monopoly, even if such entry would increase total production costs and
lead to higher prices for some consumers.
Natural monopoly over several commodities can arise from global
subadditivity of the cost function—that is, the situation where the cost
of producing all commodities together is less than the cost of producingTheory and Practice: Overview 15
the same amount of each separately. Contrary to the conventional
wisdom, natural monopoly does not guarantee the existence of a vector
of break-even prices that will preclude entry (the natural monopoly may
not be sustainable for any break-even price vector) even if the natural
monopoly is producing output efficiently and charging efficient prices.
Very simply, a break-even monopoly may have to set the prices for some
services higher than is necessary to recover the "stand-alone" costs of
serving some coalition of consumers. If firms enter in response to these
price-cost margins, the result will be increases in the total costs of pro-
duction and in the prices charged for other commodities or to those
customers not included in the new coalition.
Panzar and Willig (1977) showed that the presence or the absence of
any sustainable (entry-blocking) price vector that covers the natural
monopolist's cost of production depends on interproduct-substitution
effects on the demand side, product-specific economies of scale, and
economies of joint production. In order for a natural monopoly to be
unsustainable, some product-specific economies of scale, or else the
economies of joint production, must have been exhausted, so that further
increases in the output of some product must raise either its own or some
other product's average cost. If diseconomies of joint production are being
experienced at the margin, then greater interproduct-substitution effects
and product-specific scale economies will make the existence of sustainable
prices less likely. If product-specific diseconomies of scale are present,
greater economies of joint production will make the existence of sustain-
able prices more likely. Baumol et al. (1977) showed that Ramsey-optimal
prices will be sustainable under very strong conditions.
To date, the sustainability literature has skirted three major issues
that are directly related to its principal theoretical results. First, the
models presume perfect regulation that manages to force monopolists
to produce at least cost and at zero economic profit. Second, entrants
are confined to producing some subset of the products that are being
offered by the monopolist, rather than offering other products that are
not colocated in goods-characteristic space with the products of the
monopolist. Because ex ante the monopolist offers all feasible com-
modities, the question of the optimal product mix is not addressed. Once
the product mix is allowed to become variable, the optimal market
structure, even with pervasive economies of scale and scope, could be
monopolistic competition rather than monopoly. Third, the question
of the response of the monopolist to entry—and, therefore, the viability
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comparative statics, the original firm can cut its losses by reducing its
own product mix, and in so doing undermine the position of the entrant.
In a world in which an incumbent firm has an advantage because of
established business patterns and information costs, an incumbent could
undermine the position of an entrant simply by duplicating its product mix.
Although the authors of these papers (especially Panzar and Willig)
exercise caution in drawing policy conclusions from their theoretical
results, we are concerned about the improper policy inferences that might
be drawn from this literature. The primary policy inference is that entry
should be carefully scrutinized to ensure that society captures all the
benefits of natural monopoly. In the context of a specialized model in
which Ramsey prices are sustainable, Baumol et al. (1977) suggest that
"the public interest is served by encouraging a monopolist to price in
anticipation of entry rather than in response to it" (p. 360).
We have a number of problems with such policy prescriptions. As
an empirical matter, strict global subadditivity is not likely to be con-
vincingly demonstrated (or refuted), even in a world without technological
change. That is, a single firm's natural monopoly over all commodities
and all output vectors normally cannot be verified on the basis of the
data that are likely to be available. Indeed, this is the heart of the problem.
Theoretical analysis can assume subadditivity, but policy application
requires that regulators know whether a monopoly is natural over the
relevant commodity space. If the monopoly is natural, a single regulated
firm can be more efficient and an exclusive franchise may make sense
(with the assumption that the regulated monopolist will be efficient).
However, if the cost function is not known with certainty, as seems
likely in most cases in which the issue arises, the imposition of entry
restrictions may allow the monopolist to provide products that would
be provided more efficiently by separate firms. This is of particular
concern in a world in which the potential for process and product inno-
vations is great and where a regulated firm's profits are not regulated
perfectly. In addition, requiring a potential entrant to prove that the
monopolist does not have a cost function that exhibits strict global
subadditivity is a burden of proof that is likely to be almost impossible
to meet.
Another difficulty with erecting entry barriers is that a protected
monopolist has less reason to engage in efficient practices. For example,
Ramsey-optimal prices are not likely to be preferred to some other
break-even price vector. Moreover, when demand functions are not
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regulatory agency to calculate and enforce. In addition, entry restrictions
reduce the impetus for least-cost production and cost-reducing techno-
logical change that might result from the threat of competitive entry.
Even if a potential entrant intended to produce a new product, bearing
the burden of proof that the product was indeed new would not only
impose costs and delays but also would provide information that would
help the monopolist prepare a competitive response.
In short, the theoretical results that have been derived in these papers
do not sustain a general argument for entry restrictions into markets
presently served by regulated monopoly firms. As yet, the theory is too
specialized and insufficiently operational to support such a strong
policy conclusion.
The only empirical application of the sustainability models that we
are aware of is a paper by Baumol and Braunstein (1977) on the industry
that publishes academic journals. That study found that the cost function
in this industry is subadditive, and that costs could be reduced by con-
centrating the industry. The authors did not propose the establishment
of a regulated monopoly for publishing academic journals; the absence
of such a conclusion, for obvious reasons, illustrates the difficulty of
deriving general policy implications from the sustainability literature.
To have policy significance the model must be extended to incorporate
complementary operational theories and empirical results on the issues
of optimal product mix, relationship of product mix to market structure,
and effect of market structure on rate and direction of technical change.
The current value of the sustainability model is that it eliminates a
shibboleth from the economics literature by demonstrating that one
cannot prove theoretically that natural monopolies do not need a fran-
chising process that protects them from entry. Whether entry restrictions
are justified in any particular case is a largely empirical matter that
depends on static and dynamic aspects of costs and product mix.
Variable Pricing In the literature on monopoly pricing, the one great
practical triumph of theory is the work on peak-load (variable) pricing.
(We prefer the latter term because recent developments in this literature
have generalized the results beyond the case of the time-variant demand.)
Beginning with papers by Houthakker (1951) and Boiteux (1951; 1960), a
series of articles has steadily advanced the state of knowledge about an
important practical problem: pricing in a situation in which short-term
supply and demand conditions fluctuate so that, even when investments
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quantitatively important and recurring mismatches between demand
and capacity (see Kahn 1970, chapters 3 and 4).
In complete detail the variable-pricing problem is very complex. On
the demand side, the position of the demand curve varies continuously
over time. Some sources of time-dependent demand are regular and
predictable, but others are not; thus, the quantity demanded at a given
price is a random variable, drawn from a distribution function with
time-dependent parameters. On the supply side, the firm has several
different technologies it can use to produce output, each of which has
unique long-run and short-run cost characteristics. Supply, too, is a
random variable in that, in the short run, a particular technology may
be operational only at less than full capacity; a plant may shut down
unexpectedly, or the sun may fail to shine on solar collectors.
The institutional constraints on the pricing problem can also vary.
The goal may simply be economic efficiency, but it may include upper
and lower bounds on the profitability of the enterprise. Moreover, the
firm may be allowed to adopt price structures of varying complexity—
for example, by adopting multipart tariffs, or by segmenting customers
into various groups, each of which faces a different price structure. And,
of course, each of the institutionally feasible pricing systems has an
implementation cost, such as the metering devices necessary to initiate
time-dependent pricing. Finally, institutional arrangements to deal with
excess demand must be incorporated into the model if prices and demand
cannot vary instantaneously; examples of this are random rationing,
preplanned rationing based upon value of service, and temporary elimina-
tion of service to some users.
As stated, the variable-pricing problem has not been solved, although
several problems that bite off a large chunk of it have been. One strain
of papers, including Houthakker 1951, Boiteux 1951 and 1960, Steiner
1957, Hirschleifer 1958, Turvey 1968, Wenders 1976, and Panzar 1976,
established the basic peak-load-pricing results. These papers deal with
cost functions and variable-demand relations in which time dependence
is known with certainty. They address pricing problems that are concerned
only with economic efficiency, unconstrained by revenue limits, but with
the institutional constraint that in each period a single price applies to
all units of output. (This price can vary from period to period.) These
papers provide successively more refined definitions of the appropriate
concept of marginal cost and versions of the basic result that prices ought
to equal marginal cost in each period.
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is the incorporation of random variation in demand and supply. French
utility economists, especially Boiteux, have investigated this problem
since the early 1950s. (See Dreze's excellent summary [1964]; see also
Balasko 1974 and Joskow 1976.) Their concern, as well as that of Crew
and Kleindorfer (1976), is to incorporate two additional features of
demand into the optimal pricing model: the uncertainty attached to the
quantity demanded at a given price at any time, and the social costs
associated with a failure to satisfy all demand at the going price. This
extension of the model produces two useful results: a marginal-cost
pricing rule that incorporates expected marginal operating costs and
expected marginal rationing costs, and an optimal-investment rule that,
on average, produces excess capacity (the optimal reserve margin) even
in peak periods.
The significance of variable-pricing theory lies in its practical
importance. Pricing schemes derived primarily from variable-pricing
models are employed in several European countries to sell electricity
(see Acton and Mitchell 1977). In France, for example, the year is
separated into five periods (winter peak, winter shoulder, summer
shoulder, winter off-peak, and summer off-peak) with differing proba-
bilities that demand will exceed capacity. Customers buy capacity rights
for each period at different prices, and face an additional use charge
per kilowatt-hour which also varies by period. The capacity rights
specify the maximum amount of instantaneous power a customer is
permitted to demand in each period, and revenues from the sale of
capacity rights are an important factor in investment decisions. In-
expensive control and metering devices, and even continuous digital home
displays of current and total energy use, are in widespread use. The U.S.
government has financed peak-load-pricing experiments in ten states,
and in about twenty states time-of-day rates have been either ordered
by regulators commissions or proposed voluntarily by utility companies
(see Joskow 1979a, 1979b).
The atypical success of the variable-pricing literature, in terms of its
practical impact, is worth trying to explain. Most economists who work
in applied areas such as the economics of regulation believe that economics
has something important to say to practitioners, yet they often are
frustrated by the snail's pace at which economic rationality creeps into
actual practice. Park (1973) even assembled a book of essays that con-
stitutes a lament for the impotence of economists in another area (cable
television policy)—a lament that is equally appropriate to numerous
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The reasons for the success of the variable-pricing literature are
numerous, and no attempt will be made here to detail them (for details
see Joskow 1979a, 1979b). But one interesting element is that well over
half of the references cited in this section were written by people who
were willing to work with utility managers and whose research is to
some degree the result of successive confrontations of theory with reality.
Most of the French authors work for Electricite de France, and in the
United States many papers in recent years have been written by economists
associated with one or more peak-load-pricing experiments or with Bell
Labs. These economists have carried on the theoretical search for a
general theory of optimal pricing, but their work has demonstrated two
additional features: Great attention has been paid to bringing the assump-
tions of the models ever closer to the realities of operating a utility,
and nearly all of the papers recognize the problems and costs associated
with implementing a perfect pricing scheme and even provide some
additional analysis on locating (in the manner of Baumol and Quandt
1964) the "optimally imperfect" scheme. Perhaps it is accidental that
a literature with successes in practical application also has these charac-
teristics, but we doubt it.
Before concluding our discussion of the regulation of natural
monopolies, we must note that Demsetz (1968) questioned the basic
natural-monopoly justification for regulation. He suggested that, even
where technological considerations indicate that a single producer would
be most efficient, the use of some form of competitive franchise bidding
could prevent a natural monopoly from behaving like a classical mono-
polist. Williamson (1976) and Goldberg (1976) criticized this approach
because of its simplistic and idealized notion of private contracting and
the problems that might arise in structuring and enforcing private
contracts for natural monopolies. Both of these papers try to examine
the nature of the private contracting problems that may result, and
suggest that many of the problems that may arise are similar to the kinds
of problems that regulatory agencies must deal with. They suggest that
regulatory agencies may be an efficient substitute for private contracting
in certain circumstances.
The more expansive conceptualization of private contracting
institutions introduced by Williamson and Goldberg raises serious
questions about the utility of comparing the performance of actual
regulated markets with idealized models of competitive market behavior
that ignore the costs of private contracting. More extensive empirical
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environments and of the costs of negotiation and enforcement would be
useful for advancing our understanding of the costs and benefits of
alternative institutional arrangements.
Environmental, Product-Quality, and Health Regulation
The most vigorous recent extensions of government intervention are
actions intended to improve the quality of the environment, of consumer
products, and of workplaces. Agencies such as the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration are having increasingly important effects on the economy.
Rapid extensions of rate and entry regulation in the health-care sector
by states and by the federal government have been accompanied by
regulatory control, yet relatively little useful research on the behavior
and performance of these agencies has been forthcoming.
A substantial amount of theoretical research into externalities, in-
formation costs, product quality, consumer misperceptions, and moral
hazards underlies a theoretical case for government intervention in many
of these areas. The empirical relevance of these market imperfections
has proved difficult to document because the information that is needed
to measure it cannot be easily inferred from market transactions. Even
in the case of environmental externalities, which most economists agree
require some form of government intervention, there is disagreement
about the particular instruments to be used and the ability of government
regulatory agencies to deal with the problem effectively.
Environmental Regulation The best-developed theoretical models in
the area of noneconomic regulation deal with environmental external
diseconomies. The theoretical characterization of the environmental
problem is borrowed directly from the public-finance literature on
collective goods, and is a straightforward application of Samuelson's
classic paper (1954). What is special about the theory of environmental
externalities is the rather interesting array of institutional interventions
by government that have been explored in the theoretical literature.
If perfect information were available about the benefits and costs of
alternative abatement strategies for every source of pollution, the problem,
in both theory and practice, would be relatively uninteresting. With
perfect, costless information, optimal source-specific standards could be
legislated. The interesting aspects of the problem are related to the
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at each point of reception, and the costs and benefits of abatement that
a regulator faces. A regulator can know only imperfectly where pollution
is created and received and whether a source is in compliance with a
regulatory rule. Moreover, regulatory interventions generate more
information about the relevant facts of environmental problems, so
that changes in regulatory constraints have two objectives: to produce
a more efficient result in their own right and to generate more information
to guide further alterations in the regulations.
Most economic-policy analyses of environmental problems propose
the use of negotiations and corrective taxes to "internalize the exter-
nality." Baumol and Oates (1971) set up the problem in a straightforward
partial-equilibrium format, regarding pollution abatement as having
costs to abaters (which generate a surrogate supply function) and benefits
to recipients (which generate a surrogate demand function). The policy
problem is seen as imposing an emission tax that balances at the margin
the costs and benefits of abatement. Ayres and Kneese (1969) and
Leontief (1970) set up specialized linear general equilibrium models which
include environmental externalities and in which the appropriate taxes
appear as shadow prices. The implementation of emissions taxes may
have been advocated most cogently in the public policy arena in a series
of monographs by Kneese and others at Resources for the Future (see,
for example, Kneese and Schultze 1975).
A less popular "economist's solution" to environmental problems,
and one that also relies on decentralized processes to achieve efficiency,
is to create tradable licenses to pollute. Coase (1960) saw externalities
as a problem in incomplete specification of property rights, over which
polluters and recipients could, in principle, negotiate once rights were
defined and enforced. Dales (1968) provided a discussion of tradable
pollution licenses that is rich in examples of how such a system might
be implemented. Montgomery (1972) formalized the theory of tradable
licenses and showed the conditions under which a given amount of
pollution abatement is accomplished at least cost by creating tradable
licenses.
The fascination of economists with marketlike mechanisms to deal
with environmental problems is particularly interesting in light of the
largely negative theoretical results on the effectiveness of decentralized
processes that have appeared in the literature. One set of problems,
emphasized by Davis and Whinston (1962), Montgomery (1974), and
others, has to do with the thinness of each artificial market for a pollutant.
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commodities subject to market transactions that would allow a com-
petitive solution to the problem of efficient abatement is a separate
market for each pollutant that is delivered to each receptor. If the number
of receptors at one point is greater than one or if the number of polluters
in any particular market is small, price-taking (Cournot) behavior is not
likely to conform to actual firm behavior. This undermines the efficiency
of both markets in licenses and iterative tax processes.
The second set of problems is that not all equilibria that are reached
by an iterative tax scheme or private negotiations over well-specified
rights are efficient, and that not all efficient equilibria are stable even
if Cournot behavior is followed. The difficulty is that pollutants that
reduce the productivity of other production processes (including "con-
sumption" production processes of the type hypothesized by Lancaster
[1966]) can never drive the marginal productivity of resources in other
processes to zero, because firms (or people) can exit. This means that,
in some range, pollution abatement must involve economies of scale and
discrete exit or entry points (which must make the problem amenable
to corner solutions). Noll and Trijonis (1971) pointed out that the earlier
approach to calculating prices from general equilibrium models required
one to assume either that pollution costs are independent of output or
that the marginal costs of abatement are independent of pollution.
Their extension of the Ayres-Kneese and Leontief models admits the
possibility of unbounded effects of pollutants on costs. As Starret (1972)
demonstrated in a more realistic model, an iterative tax can reach an
equilibrium at relatively small amounts of abatement, yet the equilibrium
may be dominated by higher levels of abatement (achieved with higher
taxes) that capture the gains from scale economies. Moreover, Mont-
gomery (1976) showed that the necessary conditions for an efficient
solution to a bargaining process requires that pollutants enter all pro-
duction and cost functions separately, and that this condition is incon-
sistent with the conditions for the existence in equilibrium of more than
one pollution-producing and pollution-receiving firm.
In terms of the practicality of implementing environmental policies,
the second set of criticisms is probably more important than the first.
Because the full extension of the commodity space contemplated by
Arrow (1970) is impractical, problems of thin markets are unlikely to
loom large in comparison with other difficulties. Moreover, no one has
seriously proposed (although the demand-revealing mechanism of Groves
and Ledyard [1977] may be waiting in the wings) that receptors will be
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of licenses to pollute that will be issued, except through the imperfect
mechanism of the representative political process. The practical problem
is whether a sequence of tax or license messages to polluters will produce
minimum-cost responses so that decisionmakers, using whatever magic
is at hand, can measure the consequences of these iterations and locate
an equilibrium that works efficiently, notwithstanding the effects of
imperfections in political processes for aggregating preferences and in
the definitions of separate pollution markets.
The economists' traditional scheme for using market mechanisms to
correct externalities has rarely been utilized. Corrective-tax and tradable-
license schemes have almost entirely taken a back seat to direct control
of effluents or specification of particular control technologies (Jacoby
and Steinbrunner 1973; Mills and White 1978). Part of the problem is
that the economists who advocate these policy instruments have usually
ignored the problems of information costs, administrative feasibility, and
uncertainty that characterize the real world in which these policies must
be applied. When economists have considered these factors, they have
identified circumstances that lead to a preference for standards—even
input standards—rather than decentralized market processes (Spence
and Roberts 1976; Spence and Weitzman 1978). But this cannot be the
entire explanation. Mills and White (1978) provided a fascinating analysis
of the historical evolution of auto emission controls, and presented a
convincing case that a workable tax scheme has been available and
would have been superior to the course followed by Congress and the
EPA. For some reason, there appears to be an administrative and political
bias towards rules and standards and away from markets in the area
of environmental control. Exactly why such a bias exists is unclear, but
eliminating it appears to be a prerequisite to implementing decentralized
methods in this area.
Health, Safety, and Performance Standards Economists have yet to
invent a felicitous term for the grab bag of regulatory policies that fall
under this heading. Nevertheless, such disparate regulatory activities as
occupational licensing, product-safety standards, occupational-health
regulation, and truth-in-packaging requirements do have a unifying
theme: All seek to protect parties to private market transactions from
making decisions that they will regret. In individualistic microeconomics,
the conceptual basis for these interventions lies in market imperfections
that are due to costly and inexact information about the consequences
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Conventional microeconomic theory was built upon the assumption
of costless and perfect information about the characteristics of jobs and
products and about the prevailing set of wages and prices. But, as Arrow
(1963), Stigler (1961), and others have taught us, information is itself
a commodity in that it requires resources to produce and can have
economic value to decisionmakers. Moreover, the production and
evaluation of information is empirically a very important economic
activity, as demonstrated by Machlup (1962) and Porat (1977).
Economists have taken two theoretical approaches to exploring the
microeconomic foundations that might, in principle, provide a rationale
for various forms of protective regulation: to postulate an exogenously
determined state of imperfect information that cannot be affected by
individual economic agents, and to make information an endogenous
commodity that enters production and consumption decisions.
In a model developed by Spence (1977), consumers misperceive the
hazards of products and therefore take more risks than they would take
if fully informed. A similar model of a labor market for hazardous jobs
would yield too-ready acceptance of risky occupations. This approach
has a hint of paternalism, in that the informational difficulty is really
ignorance, and in such a state consumers or workers would not know
what they wanted regulated—the better-informed would have to tell
them. The exception is Hinich's (1975) model of food regulation, which
incorporates an insurance system or a similar risk-spreading mechanism
to pay for health care. As long as sellers of insurance cannot tell the
difference between ignorant and informed individuals (see Arrow 1963),
excessive risk taking (moral hazard) by the former will impose a pecuniary
external diseconomy on the latter. Thus, the informed group pushes for
banning risky products and workplaces in order to save the cost of
subsidizing the medical care of the ignorant. One is left with the problem
of explaining why regulation, rather than a change in the institutions
for financing medical care, is imposed.
Oi (1973) took an approach similar to that of Hinich, but asked a
different question with a different set of specialized assumptions. Oi
assumes that producers may be legally liable for injuries suffered by
consumers, but that they have no mechanism for knowing the damage
costs associated with individual consumers. Consumers, on the other
hand, are assumed to have perfect information about product risks,
to know their expected damage costs, and to be able to obtain actuarily
fair insurance at negligible cost. As a result, producer liability leads to
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a combined product and insurance policy across heterogeneous con-
sumers. Strict consumer liability allows the consumer to purchase the
optimal quality of product and the optimal insurance policy separately.
The analyses of Hinich, Oi, and Spence, though each is obviously
specialized, clearly point the way for a more general theoretical model
of the informational problem that could underpin protective regulation.
Such a model would take account of the following two considerations:
First, insurance companies might have as much difficulty as producers
in separating individuals into homogeneous risk pools, and may be unable
to write insurance contracts that avoid moral hazard. Second, producers
might know nothing about differences among consumers in their suscep-
tibility to damage, and consumers might be unable to figure out the
ex ante risks of products or even which product was responsible ex post
if they suffered an injury or illness.
The main weakness of models with exogenous information states is
that they ignore the process by which agents gather and evaluate infor-
mation. Facing a positive marginal cost of information, a rational agent
purchases information up to the point at which the marginal gains from
more informed decisions are balanced by the marginal cost of information.
If the market for information is perfectly competitive, decisions will be
"optimally imperfect" in the sense of Baumol and Quandt 1964. Unfortu-
nately, as Davis and Kamien (1970) pointed out, the market for infor-
mation does have one theoretical difficulty: Information is not completely
a private good. Once knowledge is produced for one person, it need
not be produced independently for others who might want to use it.
Thus, if knowledge is priced to recover its full cost, its price exceeds
marginal cost and some people may be excluded from using it who would
be willing to pay the marginal cost of making it available to them.
In addition to the fact that it may support some sort of public provision
of subsidization of information about product quality and workplace
safety, the preceding discussion also admits the possibility that standards
and bans make sense. The reasoning is that decisionmaking that is based
upon the processing of complex information is time-consuming, and
thereby has some shadow price. Moreover, if numerous individuals
make essentially the same decision on the basis of the same information,
and if the tastes of the individuals are identical, it would pay the group
to elect one person to process the information, make the decision, and
tell everyone else what to do (Colantoni et al. 1976). Of course, if prefer-
ences are not identical, delegation of decision power creates consumption
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to consume qualities of products and experience risks at work that are
not the same as if each person had made an independent decision. Thus,
standardization of workplaces and products to remove certain types of
risks saves information-processing costs at the expense of creating some
inefficiencies and administrative costs. The point at which a regulatory
policy balances these costs at the margin represents what Cornell et al.
(1976) identify as the optimal delegation of decisionmaking authority.
The empirical importance of these theoretical arguments is critical,
yet is still largely unresolved, and perhaps unresolvable. If a public
agency can collect, evaluate, and disseminate information more efficiently
than can the private market, we have an argument for regulation in the
form of public provision of information. But as a practical matter, to
make the measurements required for such a judgment ex ante is quite
difficult. Even ex post it would be difficult to determine whether the
public provision of information is beneficial. The net effect of beneficial
regulation should be to shift the demand for the regulated products
outward by reducing the gross cost of the product to the consumer
through a reduction in information-gathering expenses. If the increase
in welfare at the prevailing market price is greater than the costs of
providing the information through a public authority, society will
presumably be better off. However, isolating demand shifts that are due
to a reduction in the costs of information borne by consumers from
changes in demand that arise from a myriad of other causes is likely to
be a very difficult empirical task. On the other hand, while it will be
difficult to determine a hard point estimate of the benefits of the public
provision of information, a good upper-bound estimate for the net costs
of such interventions ought to be possible. As long as the public agency
does not provide incorrect or misleading information, the administrative
costs of collecting, evaluating, and distributing the information will
provide an upper-bound estimate of the costs of regulation.
The situations in which a theoretical case for standards can be made
present even more difficult problems for evaluation in practice. The
regulation of product quality (including the banning of certain products)
requires us to know not only that a public authority can collect and
evaluate the relevant information more efficiently than can individual
agents in the market, but also that the more efficient use of these results
is to set a standard or ban rather than to provide the information directly
to consumers. This is a difficult case to make. Regulators are more likely
to set the wrong standard than to provide incorrect information, for
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difficult to determine the "right" product quality for all consumers.
Second, agencies with responsibility and political accountability for
regulating risky products are likely to be extremely averse to approving
a product that results in some injuries or deaths, even if approval is an
efficient decision. Third, the standard-setting process is likely to be more
easily captured by some particular interest group, whether a consumer
group that thinks people ought not to eat hotdogs even if they want to
or a producer group that can use the standards as a means to help cartelize
an industry by making entry and product differentiation difficult. In
addition, standard setting is likely to be more costly, because it requires
an enforcement mechanism to be effective.
We suspect that, in most situations in which public collection and
evaluation of information is more efficient than the private market, the
direct provision of this information to consumers will be a regulatory
alternative superior to the establishment of standards and bans on
products. Standard setting makes sense only in those situations in which
a strong case can be made that the dissemination of information is
extremely costly, or that consumers will find it difficult to use the infor-
mation effectively. Thus, we find troublesome the propensity of agencies
such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission to opt for setting
standards rather than providing information.
In analyzing the effects of the 1962 amendments to the Food and
Drug Act, Peltzman (1973) developed the following hypothesis about
protective regulation: Effective regulation should reduce the amount
of learning about product quality that takes place during the first few
years a product is marketed. In particular, Peltzman argues that the
demand for a new drug will decline more slowly with effective regula-
tion because the agency will already have done some of the learning
about the quality of the drug before it is marketed. McGuire et al. (1975)
correctly pointed out that almost nothing can be concluded from an
analysis of the aggregate demand for new drugs. Among other things,
they question Peltzman's assumption that all consumers make the same
kind of error when purchasing new drugs. For example, without FDA
scrutiny, physicians may not prescribe a new drug until more evidence
of its effects are known. Such behavior would lead, over time, to move-
ments of individual demand functions that would be just the opposite
of those proposed by Peltzman, and could simply cancel out the behavior
of those individuals who behave as Peltzman suggests when the aggregate
demand function is observed.
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between consumer preferences and observed drug purchases is much the
same as that in a typical commodity market, such as the market for new
soft drinks. This ignores a number of important, special characteristics
of the drug market. First, individuals do not make direct decisions about
what drugs to consume; their physicians do. While physicians, prescrib-
ing behavior is an unsettled area, serious questions have been raised
about the ways in which physicians respond to drug prices and how they
evaluate the information available about drug quality. Second, patients
generally buy a package of medical-care services from a doctor or a
hospital, with a large portion of the total cost borne by third parties.
Consequently, the connection between consumer preferences and ob-
served drug demand is indirect.
Peltzman raises another issue, concerning the effects of regulation on
innovation. If a regulatory intervention requires prior approval before a
new product can be marketed, the effect is to increase the cost of product
innovations directly by requiring more research and indirectly by delay-
ing initial marketing (see Grabowski and Vernon 1976). Peltzman (1973)
argued that the supply reductions caused by the 1962 drug amendments
led to a reduction in the growth of demand for drugs after 1962. We
infer that the source of a connection between supply limitations and the
position of the demand curve that Peltzman has in mind is that some
areas of the product space have been excluded by regulation, so that an
aggregated-demand curve for all drugs in the two periods actually spans
a different product set. A reduction in the number of drugs on the market,
according to this conceptualization of the problem, would cause the
representative consumer to find a greater distance in product space be-
tween the most desirable drug in principle and the closest approximation
to it in reality. Even if this is so, to conclude that a backward shift in the
demand curve for drugs represents a loss in welfare is not justified.
Because drugs are supposed to treat illness, one source of the reduction
in the demand for drugs could be that drugs are more effective, on aver-
age, in curing treatable illnesses. Or, perhaps fewer people have to be
treated for illnesses arising from taking bad drugs. In short, an improve-
ment in the quality of drugs does not necessarily mean that drug sales
will increase, particularly if the improvements take the form of replace-
ments for less effective drugs that required greater dosages.
Data problems have plagued attempts to evaluate consumer-protec-
tion regulation in areas other than drugs. Starting in the late 1960s in
the Food and Drug Administration and continuing since 1973 in the
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collected a great amount of information on hospital admissions and
emergency treatments for injuries sustained in connection with the use
of an extremely wide array of consumer products, encompassing even
athletic equipment used in organized sports. Though some accident re-
ports are followed by intensive investigations of the cause of the injury, for
the most part the data leave open the cause of an accident. For example,
an accident would be chalked up to the "processed foods" category if
a person broke a toe by dropping a can of corn as well as if the can exploded
without apparent provocation. Moreover, because data on the use of
products are not collected, neither scholarly research nor safety-regulatory
agencies have been successful in allocating the change in accidents asso-
ciated with a product among changes in the hazards inhering in a product
(such as might occur when a regulatory rule is imposed) and changes in
the use of a product (such as might occur if safety regulations increased
the price of the product substantially). (This argument was advanced by
Cornell etal. [1976].)
Even in the area of automobile safety, which has somewhat better
data spanning a longer period of time, the empirical analysis of the
effects of safety regulation is controversial. The most detailed study
(Peltzman 1976a) attempts by time-series analysis to detect the effect
of safety regulations on automobile accidents. Peltzman's interesting
insight—which is applicable to all safety and health regulation—is that
the imposition of protective regulations might cause consumers to engage
in more risky behavior, thereby offsetting some of the potential effec-
tiveness of the regulations. The difficulty in trying to test the empirical
importance of this argument is that it requires a complete specification
of the process by which the riskiness of an activity is determined. In the
case of auto safety, not only can cars change, but so can the physical lay-
outs of roads, the attentiveness of the driver, the amount of safety-related
maintenance the car receives, the driver's selection of driving speed and
route (a safe, indirect interstate or a dangerous but direct county road?),
and, for reasons other than safety of the automobile, the composition of
the driving force. The task of convincingly taking account of all of these
factors is monumental, and the discussion by Manne and Miller (1976)
of Peltzman's attempt reveals that consensus was not reached.
In the area of occupational safety, relating workplace hazards to wages
and relating safety standards to injuries have proved easier to accom-
plish, and economists are in general agreement that OSHA has prob-
ably generated more costs than benefits. Although some empirical work
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consensus on the effect of the agency rests primarily on more indirect
evidence. R. Smith (1976) summarized a series of studies that he and
others carried out for the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Policy, and
presented some new information that attempted to quantify the aggre-
gative impact of OSHA standards on industrial accidents. He found no
measurable impact. R. Smith and the staff of the Council on Wage and
Price Stability also undertook several benefit-cost analyses of specific
OSHA standards, and concluded that the price tag on these regulations
is also probably too high. For example, Smith (1976) estimated that
workers would have to value reductions in hearing due to current noise
at approximately $15,000 to make the standards worthwhile.
One difficulty with these empirical studies is that the data on indus-
trial accidents are notoriously poor. Experience rating for workmen's-
compensation insurance gives employers an incentive to pay off injured
workers and not report accidents. The problem of analyzing the impact
of OSHA regulations was compounded by a change in Department of
Labor injury-reporting procedures that occurred approximately at the
same time OSHA was created. Even with reliable injury statistics,
estimating the costs of accidents and of avoidance strategies is difficult.
As an example of the empirical problems on the benefit side, the evalua-
tion of the noise abatement standards uses data on the relationship of
values of property near airports to decibels of noise from airplances to
measure the disutility of noise in the workplace. A few of the assump-
tions implicit in this approach are that the undesirability of noise in
properties near an airport is the same as the undesirability of noise in a
workplace; that the disutility of noise is measured by a scalar (loudness)
and is unrelated to frequency, intermittancy, and other measures of
noise; and that a linear relationship exists between the monetary value
and the amount of noise (this last assumption is known to be inaccurate,
for example with respect to the relationship between hearing loss and
noise). Yet, even after these criticisms have been made, one is at a loss
to propose a distinctly better method. One can expect to obtain only
indirect evidence on the disutility of noise or most other sources of work-
related injuries by observing transactions in labor, product, and property
markets. Consequently, benefit-cost analyses of proposed standards,
though useful as a device to organize thought and evidence, are unlikely
to prove definitive in determining the value of a standard.
The best economic arguments against OSHA have to do with the
agency's selection of regulatory targets and with the enforcement of its
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favor of regulatory interventions that the more complex the problem of
processing information about a hazard, the more likely that a stand-
ard (rather than an informational requirement) ought to be adopted.
They concluded that OSHA appears to select regulatory targets not on
this basis but by the frequency and severity of injuries. Because workers
and employers are more likely to have given attention to dealing with
frequent, severe accidents, the likely regulatory impact here can be
expected to be small, especially if the problem is relatively easily compre-
hended. These authors and R. Smith (1976) point out that the theore-
tical case for intervention is stronger for long-term occupational health
problems, but that OSHA has focused relatively little attention on
these. Both studies also discuss the feeble incentives for complying with
OSHA standards that existing enforcement policies provide. Although
the situation varies from industry to industry, most firms can expect
an OSHA inspection about once a decade. For firms found out of com-
pliance, fines average about $170 (for an average of about six violations).
Compared to the costs of compliance, the expected losses from being
found out of compliance are minuscule; consequently, there is little
reason to expect much compliance, or much of an effect of OSHA reg-
ulations on injury rates.
One approach to the use of incentives to deal with occupational safety
problems is to raise fines for noncompliance and rely primarily on an
inspection system. Another is to tax injuries, as proposed by R. Smith
(1974), and rely on injury reporting to establish the basis for the tax.
Because accurate reporting of injuries is problematical, this too would
require checking, although perhaps the costs of inspection would be
lower for checking injury reports. Nevertheless, the primary advantage of
the tax approach is said to be that the regulator does not need to know
the details of injury-prevention technology, just as the environmental
regulator need not know the details of abatement technology, to impose a
tax on performance. This raises the issue of whether a tax equilibrium is
necessarily efficient, if regulators adopt the same sort of iterative pro-
cedure that was proposed for emissions taxes. To our knowledge, this
problem has not been addressed in the literature on occupational safety.
We conjecture, however, that a tax equilibrium would be efficient except
for two eventualities: The cost function for injury reduction may not be
convex, so that tax equilibria may be a local but not a global optimum,
and the pecuniary externality associated with the cost-sharing features of
health and liability insurance may introduce a further nonconvexity with
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with pollution. In addition, the problems raised by Spence and Weitzman
(1978) remain, and under certain circumstances these could tip the balance
in favor of standards.
The remaining major area of product quality regulation is occupational
licensing. The public-interest rationals for occupational licensing is the
protection of poorly informed consumers from incompetent practitioners.
Economists have long been skeptical of the value of entry barriers in any
market, and occupational licensing, especially by self-regulatory processes
such as qualifications exams, is no exception. Stigler (1971) argued that
occupational licensure is solely a device to restrict entry so that the
practitioners of licensed professions can earn more. Benham (1972) and
Benham and Benham (1975) showed that eyeglass prices are higher in
states that regulate or prohibit advertising by optometrists, and Plott
(1965) found that licensing dry-cleaning establishments has a similar
effect.
Because the public-interest purpose of occupational licensing is to
raise the quality of service, the effects on prices and wages that have been
found are not surprising. The key to whether this form of regulation
benefits only members of the protected occupational group is whether
service quality is higher in states with stricter regulation and, if it is,
whether consumers are being denied access to lower-quality services,
which, with the relevant information, they would prefer to purchase.
On a priori grounds one would suspect that quality is not improved by
entry restrictions, because so little of the regulatory effort is directed at
issues of quality. Occupational licensing is usually for a lifetime, whereas
a system designed primarily to ensure that practitioners were competent
would subject professionals to periodic examinations. Moreover, as
Benham (1972) pointed out, the American Optometric Association
places very little weight on indexes of professional competence in deciding
whether a member is in good standing; instead it allocates most of the
weight to whether the member abstains from advertising.
Nevertheless, scientific evidence on the quality issue is surprisingly
sparse. McCarthy et al. (1977) examined the quality effects of board
certification of surgeons by investigating the frequency of nonconfirmed
recommendations for elective surgery based on second-opinion reviews.
The rate of nonconfirmation does not differ significantly between board-
certified surgeons and those without board certification in their sample,
indicating that licensing has little effect on this aspect of quality. Benham
(1972) reported some comparisons of the cost of filling a given prescrip-
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must be regarded as anecdotal. Benham and Benham (1975) entered
measures of the absence of regulatory control into their equation for the
demand for eyeglasses. Although they estimated this equation for other
purposes, one use of such a specification would be to test for quality
improvements due to regulation. Better service might be expected to
increase the demand for eyeglasses, in that a greater number of marginal
cases would opt for glasses and people from adjacent jurisdictions would
seek the higher quality available in the regulated state. On the other hand,
because glasses are durable goods and because eyesight changes over
time, better service might lead to glasses that provided acceptable correc-
tion for a longer period of time, thereby reducing the time rate of demand.
Benham and Benham (1975) found that measures of the absence of
regulatory controls, while not significant by conventional standards
(t statistics of 1.2), all have positive signs—that is, demand at a given price
is higher in states with less regulation. They also found that the price
effects of regulation reduce sales by about one-third. Though these
results argue against the possibility that quality effects due to regulation
offset the price effects, they are not definitive; the greater sales in the
absence of regulation could be lemons.
In the absence of additional studies of the actual effects of licensing in
particular professions, the case against professional licensing remains
scientifically unproved. On the other hand, for many occupations, serious
skepticism continues to be warranted, especially where quality does not
appear to be a condition of the license.
Conclusions on Environmental, Product-Quality, and Health Regulation
Research associated with issues of the environment, health, and product
quality is, in a very real sense, the frontier of regulatory research. On a
practical level, these are the areas in which regulatory efforts have ex-
panded the most in recent years. On the theoretical level, an increasing
amount of research effort has gone into evaluating the behavior of
economic agents in regimes where information is costly or imperfect or
where consumers may be misinformed about the attributes of the products
they are purchasing. These efforts have served to identify a variety of
situations in which some form of collective action appears to be appro-
priate or where changes in existing liability rules may be called for. The
possible instruments for government intervention vary widely and include
the collection and dissemination of information, the establishment of
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liability. The particular instrument favored depends (not surprisingly) on
the particular assumptions made in the theoretical work.
Empirical work directed toward identifying situations in which addi-
tional government intervention may be called for and toward evaluating
existing regulatory efforts has made less progress. Some valiant efforts
have been made to come to grips empirically with the costs and benefits
of these forms of government regulation in certain industries; however,
the data required for making a convincing case are extremely difficult
to obtain from information on market transactions. In addition, the
empirical work has not kept pace with theoretical developments to the
extent that the particular types of market imperfections that regulation
might be directed toward have not been adequately incorporated into
the empirical analyses that seek to test whether the benefits of regulation
outweigh the costs. The empirical difficulties are associated with the
need to include price, quantity, and quality space. The relevant quality
attributes are difficult to measure, and optimal price, quantity, and
quality combinations are difficult to infer from market transactions if
informational and perceptual imperfections contaminate unregulated-
market transactions.
The existing theoretical and empirical work is not without value.
Although research has not provided much information on whether
regulation is appropriate, it has helped to answer the question whether,
if some set of transactions are to be regulated in response to some perceived
market imperfection, there are better and worse ways of going about it.
In the noneconomic regulatory areas, the tools available to the economist
appear to be better suited to identifying means for improving regulation
than to arguing whether regulation should be imposed. The theoretical
and empirical work done thus far is directly relevant to the former issue,
as is much of the work by economists and other scholars on other
regulatory agencies that attempts to identify the kinds of thing that
administrative agencies do relatively well and those things that they do
relatively poorly. Indeed, we advance the general proposition that far
too much of the effort of economists has been directed toward asking
whether there should or should not be regulation, and far too little effort
directed at how to improve the performance of regulatory policies.
Theories of Regulation
The litany of possible market failures contained in the preceding sections
constitutes a normative theory of regulation that had great appeal among
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of research on regulation. The essence of this normative analysis as a
positive theory is that one begins an analysis of a regulatory process
with the assumption that its purpose is to maximize some universal
measure of economic welfare, such as consumers' surplus or total surplus.
As a positive theory of regulation, the normative theory of welfare
economics is obviously incorrect. Economists have demonstrated that
regulatory agencies make numerous decisions that reduce conventional
measures of economic welfare. The reasons for the failure of the normative
theory are two: First, individuals have objectives, such as guarantees of
procedural fairness, constitutional freedoms, and pleasant human rela-
tions, that are affected by the actions of regulatory institutions but are not
yet accounted for in applied welfare economics. Second, political agents
are economic actors, as are producers and consumers, and they respond
to incentives created by political institutions and administrative pro-
cesses. For both reasons, a rational regulator would be unlikely to seek
to maximize conventional measures of economic welfare.
General theories of regulation tend to be either legislative or bureau-
cratic, in that they select either the electoral process and the incentives
operating on politicians or the bureaucratic process and the incentives
operating on regulators as the focus of analysis. In the first category is
the "Chicago School" of regulatory theory, the outstanding proponents
of which are Stigler (1971), Posner (1971, 1974), and Peltzman (1976b).
The essence of their theory is that regulation is a device for transfering
income to well-organized groups if the groups will return the favor with
votes and contributions to politicians. The theory predicts that regula-
tors will use their power to transfer income from those with less political
power to those with more. Precise a priori predictions of the direction of
this income redistribution are impossible, because it depends on the costs
and benefits of regulation as perceived by different interest groups and
their ability to exercise their power in the political arena.
In a world with perfect information and self-interested voters, there is no
natural reason why regulatory intervention is a majority-rule equilibrium
(assuming preferences are distributed in such a way that such an equi-
librium exists). In politics, organizations and contributions matter
because they affect voter information and motivation; consequently,
a legislative theory of regulation must have some theoretical connec-
tions to the electoral process. Once that connection is made, the door is
opened to political entrepreneurs who seek power rather than economic
payoff, and who pay the informational costs of communicating messages
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regulator. This possiblity limits the extent to which regulation can im-
pose costs on the general population, but does not completely offset it
because the costs would have to exceed some minimum amount before
voters could be induced to make them a primary motive for political
participation.
Of the theories of regulation that focus on the agencies themselves,
most also predict outcomes favorable to organized interests. Noll (1971)
argued that the committee structure in Congress, the mechanism of judi-
cial review, and the administrative process all favor well-organized
interests. Arguing one's case in a congressional, regulatory, or judicial
hearing is expensive, so organized groups that possess resources to expend
in this manner can be expected to influence policies to the extent that
the outcomes depend upon the information presented in these processes.
Bernstein (1955) propounded a life-cycle theory of agencies in which
they "age" from active advocates of generalized consumer interests to
passive conduits of the interest of organized groups. Eckert (1972) pro-
posed a more direct form of capture: that regulators expect to become
employees of organized interests when their regulating days are over.
The U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations (1977), after
examining data on employment histories of regulators, concluded that
conflict of interest of this sort was enough of a problem to warrant
proposing to prohibit employment of former regulators in regulated
industries for one year after their terms expire.
Not all structural theories of regulation are pinned to interest-group
aggregation. Michelman (1967) proposed that judicial processes, like
administrative reviews, serve an important psychological function by
giving people their "day in court." Williamson (1970) applied this general
framework to price regulation. The argument is that normal market
processes (because of the variability of market equilibrium) and govern-
mental interventions to improve efficiency can cause arbitrary and
capricious redistribution of income. Administrative processes are a
mechanism for ameliorating these redistributions, but they are also
processes for defusing destructive psychological responses to capricious
redistribution. Through participation in administrative processes, people
derive benefits through reduced demoralization should they have their
say and still lose. The interesting, unique feature of this theory is that it
attempts to incorporate noneconomic aspects of individual welfare into
a theory of economic welfare, setting up the possibility of a tradeoff
between economic efficiency and psychological well-being. The theory
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and procedural bias in favor of well-organized groups. The latter could
be viewed as the cost of providing other forms of noneconomic benefits.
Because bureaucracies are created and supported by legislatures,
a complete process theory of regulation must be connected to electoral
politics. For theories oriented toward interest-group influence, the key
issue is why legislators want to create regulatory institutions that are
excessively oriented toward the welfare of well-organized groups. Thus,
one way to view bureaucratic theories is as natural extensions of a legis-
lative theory. Questions concerning the operation and organization of
agencies would then no longer be central to the concern of the political
economist, just as questions about the structure of a competitive firm
are not very interesting to the economists who studies a perfectly com-
petitive industry.
A second electoral connection, separated from a pure model of interest-
group politics, was proposed by Fiorina and Noll (1978). They argued
that a national legislature composed of representatives from single-
member legislative districts creates a prisoner's dilemma for voters and
legislators: A legislator becomes one of many voters on public-policy
issues affecting the welfare of all voters, but is a monopolist in filling the
role of an ombudsman for constituents (that is, in providing information
about public activities and intervening informally in government processes
by virtue of oversight activities on behalf of the home district). To be
a good facilitator for constituents, the legislator must be in a position to
reward helpful bureaucracies, and therefore must not be a consistent
opponent of bureaucratic policy. A voter in a district can be in a prisoner's
dilemma if the electoral choice is between an opponent of regulation and
a proponent who is a good facilitator. The former, as one small voice in
the legislature, is unlikely to effect a change in policy; hence, the payoff
to the voter is greater if the proponent of an undesirable policy is elected
because in that case, the voter will receive at least some return from the
policy (though not enough to offset its cost).
The structure of the regulatory process assumes importance in this
model, because it determines the extent to which the congressman/
ombudsman can influence its outcome by informal interventions. Admin-
istrative law can be interpreted as an attempt to escape from the prisoner's
dilemma—a set of formal procedural and evidentiary rules that limit the
ability of a representative to convert regulation into porkbarrel, but that
raise the costs of participating in the process.
General theories of regulation have two major conceptual difficulties.
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positive theories of representative democracy. Regulation is typical of
government policies in that regulatory actions affect both economic
efficiency and the distribution of income, in that an important part of
both effects is on some well-organized groups, and in that regulation is
carried out by a bureaucracy according to the tenets of administrative
law. General theories have not yet explained why politicians sometimes
choose regulation but at other times choose other instruments of public
policy to distribute the favors of a pluralistic democracy, nor why the
inefficiencies of a regulatory bureaucracy differ from those of bureaucracy
generally. The second problem is that the inherent inefficiencies of
regulation that flow from these theories have no natural normative
consequence, although one would not deduce this from the tone of the
literature. That regulation fails to reach a Pareto optimum is fairly
uninteresting if no institutions exist that can reach a point that Pareto-
dominates regulation. For regulatory interventions that deal with em-
pirically important market imperfections, the departure of regulatory
equilibrium from perfect competition is not normatively compelling.
General theories of regulation face an empirical problem as well. The
pluralist theories are built upon comparisons of the economic stakes, the
degree of organization, and the resources of the interest groups, yet these
variables have proved especially difficult to measure. Empirical tests of
interest-group theories inevitably boil down to an estimate of the distribu-
tion of costs and benefits of an interventionist policy that is based on the
departure of regulated equilibrium from perfect competition. Examples
include the study of railroads by Spann and Erickson (1970) and Stigler's
(1971) empirical tests of his initial statement of the Chicago School theory.
The way in which these theories have evolved makes rejection of the null
hypothesis virtually impossible, because the empirical information that
is used to test the theory is also the information available to identify the
successful interest groups. In the absence of any clear way to reject the
hypotheses presented, the theories can easily become tautological. A
nontautological test of interest-group theories would go one step farther,
to correlate measures of the ex ante political influence of a group with its
ex post net benefits from regulation. Moreover, it could use influence
measures to explain the absence of regulation where that is the case.
Because of these conceptual and empirical problems, theories of
regulation must still be accorded less than full scientific status. Social
scientists have not yet shown convincingly that they understand what
political purposes are served by regulation, why some industries are
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other policy instruments are selected. Until answers to questions like
these are forthcoming, the theory of regulation serves as a convenient way
of organizing historical material, but not one that is particularly rich in
predictive value.
Despite these reservations about the theory of regulation, this research
has played an important role in shaping our conceptions of regulation.
It reminds us of the impossibility of a free lunch. Curing a market failure
by regulatory intervention generates costs as well as benefits because,
owing to certain features of political and bureaucratic institutions,
regulators cannot be expected to stop just at curing the market failure.
General theories also raise issues that must be faced by those who would
reform, rather than abolish, regulation. Presumably, only by asking fairly
general questions about regulation can scholars ascertain what purposes
regulation serves from the viewpoint of political and bureaucratic actors.
Understanding these purposes is a prerequisite to predicting the effect on
policy outcomes of a change in the instruments of policy.
Very little research is available on the comparative outcomes of dif-
ferent regulatory institutions. Scholars have expressed opinions about
the importance of such issues as the size of a commission, the location
of an agency in governmental hierarchy, the form of procedural and
evidentiary rules, financial support for consumerist intervenors, and the
subcommittee structure in which congressional oversight takes place;
however, little scientific research on these issues has been undertaken.
Consequently, political actors who seek to make regulation work better
can find very little of interest in the scholarly literature either to show
them how to reform the process or to convince them that nothing is
really likely to improve matters. For those who believe that regulation is
never appropriate the absence of comparative institutional analysis is
hardly a loss, but to those who believe some regulation is desirable or
simply inevitable the absence of guidelines on how to accomplish it most
efficiently is an important void in scholarly research.
Promising Directions for Research
The preceding section summarized and evaluated four main lines of inquiry
in the economics of administrative regulation. Certain lines of research
have led to important results that provide a deeper understanding of the
effects of regulation on firm and industry behavior and generate useful
information for making public policy. Other lines of research have been
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lenges for economists. Because government regulation has become an
increasingly important factor in our economy, and many important
question remain to be answered, scholarly interest in regulatory econom-
ics will continue and even increase in the future.
Because it has been a theme of this article that the returns on the
traditional theoretical and empirical tools used for analyzing government
regulation are diminishing rapidly, we bear an obligation to discuss
what we consider to be fruitful lines of future research. We do not intend
to provide a comprehensive research agenda. The discussion reflects our
own research interests, and focuses on work that would be responsive
to the issues raised above.
Research on regulation has two potential values. One is purely scienti-
fic: Research can increase knowledge about human behavior and in-
stitutions, even if it adds nothing to the ability of humans to control
their destiny. The other is practical: Research can help political actors
(voters, politicians, and bureaucrats) make decisions about public policy.
Research on the economics of regulation generally falls more into the
first category than into the second. Scholars have formulated reasons
why society might decide to override markets, and considered the prob-
lems that society's agents may face in attempting to intervene, But, except
for the literature on price regulation of competitive industries and peak-
load pricing of public utilities, regulatory research has not contributed
much to the debate about how to deal practically with the issues that
give rise to a demand for regulation, or even whether in specific situations
the issues are important enough to bother with. The one general, practical
accomplishment of research on regulation is a healthy skepticism about
the ability of regulatory agencies to deal easily and effectively with
perceived market imperfections. At the very least, research on regulation
has made life more difficult for anyone who suggests a regulatory initiative
without carefully thinking through the problems that it might entail in
practice. But scholars should be able to accomplish more than this.
The preceding remarks are not intended as an indictment of the re-
search community, for the technical methods necessary to deal with
practical regulatory problems are only now being developed. Economics
as a predictive, empirical science is a very new and rapidly developing
discipline. Political science, which we believe also to be relevant, is even
less mature, as is the branch of psychology that deals with decisionmaking.
Just as scholars of regulation made substantial breakthroughs a genera-
tion ago by applying standard neoclassical welfare economics and
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the next generation of regulatory research scholars may advance knowl-
edge (especially practical knowledge) substantially by building on several
developing areas of research in economics, in political science, and in
psychology.
Information
The most fundamental theoretical problems in research on regulation
concern making decisions with incomplete information. Among economic
theorists, the decade of the 1970s was the era of the economics of informa-
tion. Theorists have explored several nuances of two related questions:
Given a state of knowledge about contingent events, what action will a
rational decisionmaker take? How does a rational decisionmaker decide
to stop acquiring more information, which is costly, and make a decision?
Both these questions are central to an understanding of regulation. Much
regulation is justified on informational grounds, and the very existence of
administrative processes is testimony to the uncertainly that pervades reg-
ulatory decisionmaking. Consequently, the better the theory of decision-
making under uncertainty, the better will be research on the rationale,
process, and effectiveness of regulation.
Research on the economics of information has progressed since
Stigler's path-breaking 1961 paper, but the literature still lacks general
results. One major problem is that an optimal search procedure for
gathering information has not yet been identified. Gastwirth (1976)
showed that sequential-search strategies dominate optimal-sample-size
strategies, but the results in sequential models depend upon the existence
of a reservation price with which each sample price is compared. In
search models it is not clear exactly where reservation prices come from,
for buying is an occasional, discrete event (not a continuous rate of con-
sumption, as in consumer theory). Several buying events can occur at
different times and prices, and the frequency can be varied to alter time
rates of consumption. Thus, there is no natural connection between
purchase decisions and the reservation price associated with any particular
rate of consumption. Moreover, "comparison shopping" is a nonsequen-
tial process, and consumers are known to use it, as Bettman (1977)
pointed out. Once one admits nonsequential processes and assumes that
consumers do not know in advance the distribution from which samples
are being drawn, there is no foundation in preference theory for selecting
any particular sampling process. In addition, as Wilde and Schwartz
(1979) showed, in order for there to be a competitive equilibrium price
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after they can capture no further gains from additional information—in
other words, search must be consumption rather than investment.
Another source of difficulty in the literature on the economics of in-
formation is that the two behavioral foundations of the current theory
of decisionmaking under uncertainty—expected utility maximization and
Bayes's Rule—probably do not properly characterize actual decision-
making. Grether and Plott (1979) showed that, in situations involving
probabilistic risk, fully informed experimental subjects exhibit intransitive
preferences, even when the stakes are quite high; Grether (1978) showed
that in similar kinds of situations people do not update probability
information according to Bayes's Rule. These two papers bring into
serious doubt the basic assumptions of both search models and decision
theory.
These findings are shocking to economists, but they are well established
in experimental psychology. Mathematical psychologists have been
attempting to construct a new approach to decision theory that is con-
sistent with these findings since the early 1970s. The most interesting
idea thus far—"elimination by aspects"—was proposed by Tversky
(1972), who suggested that individuals solve decision problems involving
uncertainty by first classifying a problem according to what appear to
be its essential features, and then applying a general decision rule that,
through experience, has proved effective in that particular category.
This model is similar to the model proposed by March and Simon
(1959) in the context of organizational decisionmaking. March and Simon
saw as the first step in organizational problem solving the "factoring"
of problems into subelements, each given to a responsible individual to
suboptimize, and viewed the ultimate decision as an integration of a
series of partial solutions. The key feature of both the Tversky individual
model and the March-Simon organizational model is the simplification
of complex problems into something that is easier to solve but that does
not necessarily produce optimal or even consistent results.
The implication of the Tversky hypothesis is that the solution that
people will develop to problems involving incomplete information will
depend upon the particular context in which the problem arises. One
inference to be drawn from this hypothesis is that scholars should con-
centrate on developing a series of special theories dealing with different
types of informational problems without being concerned about logical
inconsistencies among the special theories. Thus, a model that describes
individual behavior in the face of uncertainties about product quality
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job search in the absence of workplace risks, and the latter may have
little in common with models that deal adequately with the response of
employees to hazards in the workplace. A second inference is that if
government intervenes to change the state of information in a substantial
way, two effects need to be predicted: how the new information changes
performance according to a particular decision rule, and how the new
information might change the context of problem solving in a way that
would cause individuals to change the decision rule that was applied
to the particular situation.
Whether Tversky's hypothesis is ultimately correct or whether a general
theory of decisionmaking with incomplete information eventually
emerges, the implication for scholars of regulation is pretty much the
same. No generally theory is in the offing, important policy issues are
now being decided on the basis of presumptions about the role of
information in economic decisions, and special theories appear promising
in the short run. A special theory of product choice with incomplete
information and government regulation would be especially important in
this context. Either this or a model of labor-market search (with wages,
not hazards, the source of uncertainty) is likely to be the first practical
problem in the economics of information to be solved. Substantial
information already exists in marketing research on how consumers
respond to various kinds of information; product-market-search models
are proliferating. The next major step will be to incorporate formal
characterizations of regulatory interventions into these search models
and to devise methods for empirical tests of the theories.
Dynamics
Another major void in economics that has potentially important im-
plications for the study of regulation is the theory of disequilibrium
price dynamics (how fast a disequilibrated market returns to equilibrium,
and the path of disequilibrium transactions as equilibrium is approached).
Alternative market organizations are inevitably compared in terms of
their equilibrium properties. This procedure makes sense if markets
spend most of their time on an equilibrium price path; however, if random,
exogenous events regularly cause supply-and-demand relations to shift
in ways that can only be known in a statistical sense by economic agents,
price dynamics can be an important element in determining the efficiency
and distributional consequences of a market.
Arrow and Capron (1959) developed a simple theory of disequilibrium
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rasian adjustment process or adaptive expectations, the predicted dis-
equilibrium path of transactions traces a price line that rises at a constant
rate that never reaches market equilibrium, and that approaches a con-
stant, limiting proportion of excess demand. V. Smith (1964) tested the
theory in an experimental setting in which participants received monetary
payoffs that were designed to induce normal market incentives, and
found that the three predictions of the theory were not borne out by the
results.
One source of the incompleteness of current theory is that the price-
dynamics problem involves the formulation of expectations and the
consummation of transactions that are based upon uncertain information,
which places the problem in the unsettled realm of information economics.
But V. Smith (1976) showed that out-of-equilibrium transactions persist
in an experimental situation designed to represent perfect competition
(one where only buyers reap surplus from market transactions and all
actors know the reservation prices of everyone else). Smith hypothesized
that when sellers can obtain no surplus, interpersonal comparisons of
utility that would otherwise be suppressed begin to enter selling decisions,
causing buyers to begin to offer inframarginal prices that differ from
equilibrium according to the extent to which they are less favored by
sellers.
The importance of this work to scholars of regulation is that different
market rules produce different amounts and flows of information among
participants in the market, and this, in turn, can affect the pattern of
disequilibrium transactions. The key issue is whether a particular method
of exchanging price/quantity offers among buyers and sellers allows, in
disequilibrium, one side of the market to capture rents from participants
on the other side who happen to have relatively intense preference—that
is, who stand to capture a large surplus in equilibrium. Institutions that
cause disequilibrium price paths to approach equilibrium systematically
from a particular direction or that prolong the period of disequilibrium
transactions when the price path is biased will alter the distribution of the
surplus that the market generates. Moreover, if random shocks occur
frequently enough so that equilibrium is only approached but never
reached, institutions that slow the adjustment process also reduce the
efficiency of the market. The efficiency loss arises because, if equilibrium
is never reached, the exchange institution affects the price of all units, not
just inframarginal ones, and therefore affects expectations about prices
and hence consumption and production plans.
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their effects on price dynamics. First, a formal regulatory proceeding in
which prices can be adjusted in one or both directions only after a formal
review leads to disequilibrium transactions that are stuck at the old
equilibrium. In periods when nominal costs are falling, "regulatory lag"
and entry controls can produce rents even in a competitive environment
by prolonging disequilibrium prices. Second, the nondiscrimination
requirements of price regulation eliminate any vestige of an auction
process from the market. Presumably, the free exchange of disequilibrium
offers adds to the richness of information in a disequilibrated market
and speeds the adjustment process, although this conjecture is yet to be
proved. If so, the requirement to serve all comers at a posted price, even
if the regulated price only binds from above, slows downward price
adjustments from the old equilibrium.
Whether price dynamics will be proved to be an important element of
market performance remains an open question, but in principle the effect
of regulation on price dynamics may create a whole new set of economic
and political explanations for regulatory interventions. The economics
literature has dealt with intertemporal instability, particularly in agricul-
ture, as a cause for a policy intervention that is designed to stabilize prices.
Oi (1961), Massell (1969), and Turnovsky (1976), among others, have
analyzed the effects on consumers' or total surplus of being guaranteed
an average equilibrium price compared with taking random draws each
period from a distribution of equilibrium prices. Although these models
deal only with comparisons of equilibrium, their premise is precisely that
necessary to make price dynamics a potentially important concern. The
obvious next step in this literature is to look at additional features of
market performance that arise from the effects of intervention on the
number and path of disequilibrium transactions.
As suggested above, price dynamics also may prove important in
another area of regulatory policy that has assumed greater importance
as deregulation of some industries has become more likely: transition
from a regulated to a deregulated state. The case here is a little weaker
than the argument for considering price dynamics when supply-and-
demand relations are uncertain; if firms know demand relations with
certainty and all have the same costs in any given market, prices can be
expected to follow the short-run marginal cost curve. But if firms are not
certain of the position of the demand curve in the range of the new short-
run equilibrium, and if firms have different short-run marginal-cost curves
and know with certainty only their own costs, a trial-and-error period
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disequilibrium is unlikely to have consequences so monumental that it
alters the case for deregulation, a price path that is substantially at odds
with that predicted by economists on the basis of long-run equilibrium
analysis could scare politicians, already edgy about the consequences of
deregulation, into aborting an experiment with competition. In fact, one
such event has already occurred: In Massachusetts, deregulation of auto-
mobile insurance was terminated after a few months because the short-
run effect was not beneficial to some consumers.
Congressional Regulatory Politics
Like all other public policies, regulation is created and nurtured by
Congress. Systematic studies of the influence of Congress on regulatory
policies, which remain to be undertaken, may prove important because
they may contribute to our understanding of the extent to which the
inefficiencies of regulation are endemic to its political environment and
because they may uncover important insights about the use of congres-
sional reforms to produce better regulation. In the latter vein, economists
are among the most outspoken proponents of "sunset laws" (which force
reenactment of regulatory statutes after some fixed amount of time),
"sunshine laws" (which require more openness in regulatory proceedings),
and mandatory benefit-cost analyses of proposed regulations (such as
the Inflationary Impact Statements the Office of Management and
Budget and the Council on Wage and Price Stability began requiring
for certain regulatory decisions in the mid-1970s). Sunset laws force
periodic congressional review of regulatory policy, while sunshine laws
and mandatory benefit-cost analysis provide Congress with more in-
formation with which to evaluate regulation. In a similar way, the nature
of congressional oversight of regulatory agencies might be altered by
rearranging the subcommittee structure of Congress, or by instituting
direct congressional responsibility for regulatory policy decisions through
such means as the proposed one-house veto.
The consequences of these reforms depend upon the likely behavior of
members of Congress should the nature and process of congressional
oversight be altered. At present the research literature provides little
insight into this issue. In general, congressional behavior appears to be
purposeful and predictable. Shepsle (1978) showed that the process by
which congressmen are assigned to committees is nearly perfect in match-
ing assignments to preferences—even to the point that, when excess
demand develops for assignment to a particular committee, the tendency
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tion is that legislative overseers of regulatory policy are overseers by
choice, a choice that presumably reflects their perceptions about what
matters to their reelectability. Ferejohn (1974) provided one link between
committee membership and reelection strategies by hypothesizing that
oversight is used to reward the districts that are represented on the over-
sight committees, and demonstrated that the distribution of the benefits of
one program (river and harbors projects) corresponds to the theory.
How the reelectability of a legislator depends upon his regulatory
oversight activities remains unknown. All that is known at present is
that oversight committees generally do attempt to influence regulatory
policy at a fairly detailed level. Weingast (1977) argued that the mechanism
of control is the relative distribution of the budget of an agency among
functional categories of expenditures, and related historical changes in
regulatory activities within several agencies to these distributional
changes. He also found that, while Congress is likely to allocate a total
budget that is roughly in line with proposals from the agency and the
executive-branch budgeters, its allocations among functional categories
(particularly in times of changes in regulatory policy) are likely to be
substantially different from those proposed. For example, the mechanisms
for making a regulatory agency the captive of the regulated industry
appears to be to reduce its analytical resources relative to its legislative
responsibilities and enforcement capabilities, thus making it more depen-
dent on outside information for decisions but more capable of enforcing
compliance with the decisions it makes.
Several important questions about congressional influence on regula-
tory policy remain to be addressed. One is the connection between the
interests of a legislator (presumably, reelection) and his oversight activ-
ities : Exactly what stake does a legislator have in overseeing regulatory
policy? Anecdotes about Lyndon Johnson's television station in Austin,
Texas, and about the "Staggers Special" (a highly unprofitable commuter
train between Washington, D.C. and the home district of Congressman
Harley Staggers in West Virginia) should be replaced by systematic,
quantitative studies of the deliverable currency of regulatory policy.
Another type of study would assess the importance of certain structural
features of regulation and oversight. Some subcommittees oversee
a single agency whereas others are responsible for several, and among the
latter some of the agencies overseen are branches of executive departments
whereas others are independent. Do any of these structural features alter
the nature of regulatory policy and the payoffs of legislative overseers?
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regulatory policy, based on goal-oriented models of the behavior of
politicians, are probably more important to those who would reform
regulation than to those who would eliminate it. However, would-be
deregulators could find them useful as well. The reason is that regulatory
reform of any kind must have the assent of Congress—if not explicitly
through legislation, then indirectly through an acceptance of change in
appointments and policies in agencies. Reformers are more likely to
succeed if the changes they propose do not threaten the interests of the
legislators who would oversee the reform. At present, the literature on
Congress and on the economics and politics of regulation provides only
the bare beginnings of an understanding of how, if at all, this can be
accomplished.
The Behavior of Regulatory Commissions
To understand the effects of regulation or to pursue regulatory reform
requires not only a better understanding of the relationship between legis-
lators and regulators, but also a better understanding of how the regu-
latory process itself works.
Most regulatory institutions are established under rather imprecise
statutes prescribing authorities, organizational structure, and particular
policy instruments. A mandate for a regulatory commission to ensure
that rates be "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" does not give
much guidance, nor does it detail the procedures the commission should
follow in arriving at decisions once some kind of operational meaning is
given to the statutory mandates. Once a regulatory organization is
established, it develops behavioral patterns and a dynamic of its own that
are constrained by Congress, but not completely. The political and eco-
nomic circumstances that led the legislature to establish the regulatory
authority may have very different effects on the actual regulatory organi-
zation. Perhaps more important is the possibility that the political,
economic, and underlying legal environment may change, in part from
forces not subject to the control of the regulatory authority and in part
from endogenous political and economic consequences of regulation itself
which result from the effects of regulation on the behavior and per-
formance of the regulated industry.
In reality, regulatory commissions have objectives, motivations, and
responsibilities far more complex than "setting price equal to marginal
cost subject to a profit constraint" or "maximizing the present worth of
the incomes of commissioners." In addition, many regulatory commis-
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who may be appointed or elected and whose terms of office may or may
not be coterminous with that of executive, and also a Civil Service staff,
including attorneys, accountants, engineers, and other administrative
personnel. As in any complex organization or bureaucracy, individuals
and groups within the commission have differing conceptions of what they
should be doing and what their contribution to the output of the organi-
zation is or should be. In addition, regulatory commissions are intimately
related to the state and federal judicial systems. Procedures for making
decisions on such things as the price of a kilowatt-hour of electricity, the
siting of a pipeline, or the location and structural characteristics of a
nuclear power plant must be consistent with statutory requirements as
interpreted by the courts and must also adhere to complex and changing
due-process requirements (Stewart 1975). Regulatory commissions
cannot adopt just any procedures they might choose, but are constrained
by court-enforced constitutional due-process requirements as well as
by the current legislation. To say that the decision of a regulatory com-
mission leads to some inefficiency in a narrow economic sense is not
to say very much, unless one considers the constraints of equity, justice,
and due process within which decisions must be made. American regu-
latory procedures and behavior increasingly reflect requirements that
the process by which decisions are made be "fair" not only to the regulated
firm, but to other concerned parties as well. Stewart (1975) indicated that
administrative law has moved steadily away from recognizing the rights
of property interests to a more expansive conception of balancing the
interests of many different groups affected directly or indirectly by
regulatory commission actions.
Complex organizations are often thought to behave according to an
internal logic. Organizations do not act independently of the economic
environment, but develop stable behavioral patterns to process informa-
tion and to perform actions, at least in the short run. Organizations such
as firms, government agencies, and regulatory commissions develop
these decisionmaking rules along with and according to their own
concepts of the environment in which they operate. They perceive the
environment as having a particular structure, which includes a notion of
who the relevant economic actors are, how they behave in response to
various stimuli, and how they relate to one another. In addition to the
fact that the organizations possess decision rules for processing informa-
tion, their perception of the structure of the world (or that of its consti-
tuent parts) determines what information is observed and processed. For
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reality in which it operates. The structure of the environment that the
organization perceives may be quite different from the objective reality;
however, this structure or model of the economic and political environ-
ment works from the viewpoint of the organization, in that it consistently
explains the behavior with which the organization is concerned.
In the longer run, many students of organizations view organizational
structure and behavior as adaptive, responding (often slowly) to changes
in the external environment in which the organization operates as short-
run decision rules no longer seem to work satisfactorily (March and Simon
1959, pp. 168-170; Cyert and March 1963). Decision rules must often
change over time, and so must the structural concept of the environment.
If decision rules are not easily modified in the context of the organization's
perception of the structure of the world, serious adaptive problems can
arise. A new concept of the world may arise, leading to a new set of deci-
sion rules that are consistent with it. Alternatively, the organization could
become dysfunctional if it does not possess the capability to deal effectively
with changed circumstances in the real environment.
As Allison (1972) demonstrated nicely, the "conceptual window"
through which we view organizations (in particular, bureaucracies) has
critical implications for our ability to predict behavior, especially behavior
that is not routine. Work by Niskanan (1971) and Downs (1967) dealing
with government bureaucracies argues persuasively that the complex
patterns of goals and behavior characteristic of government organizations
make it extremely difficult to predict the outcomes of such processes by
merely looking at the motivating forces behind their initial establishment.
Thus, even if one variant of the "market failure" or "capture" theory
correctly captures the raison d'etre for the establishment of regulatory
commisions, these theories may not be particularly useful for under-
standing the behavior of such agencies over time. In addition, the plural-
istic character of much regulation in the United States, which involves
overlapping and often ambiguous jurisdictions among different regulatory
agencies and between regulatory agencies and the judicial, executive, and
legislative branches, seems to require a more expansive concept of regula-
tory processes that would include more of an emphasis on the regulatory
tasks and goals with respect to a particular regulated industry, how they
are transformed into regulatory procedures, and how they change over
time.
Extensive attempts at modeling the behavior of regulatory agencies
and regulatory processes have not as yet been forthcoming. Joskow
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Commission with regard to the process of setting the allowed rates of
return in formal regulatory proceedings. He found the commission's
behavior to be stable and predictable, but uncovered some adaptive be-
havior in response to problems engendered by rapid inflation. In a more
general study of state public-utility regulation, Joskow (1974) presented a
model of a passive state regulatory agency whose behavior adapts to
pressures from the economic and political environment in which it
operates, and showed how rapid inflation and the recognition of environ-
mental groups as intervenors in administrative proceedings change the
behavior of the commission and the results of the regulatory process.
This study emphasizes the relationship among commission tasks, the
economic performance of the regulated firms, and specific regulatory
procedures.
Joskow (1973a) also pointed to another important aspect of regulatory
behavior that has often been overlooked in analyses of the effects of
government regulation on industry behavior and performance. Much of
what is known about what regulators do comes from hearings, court
cases, commission opinions (MacAvoy 1971), and the statutes authorizing
the regulation. These documents and the process they describe represent
the formal regulatory process, that is, the documented legal process open
for public inspection. It represents the occasional contacts between the
regulators and the firms they regulate in formal regulatory or court pro-
cedures. Joskow 1973a documents the importance of the informal regula-
tory process (the day-to-day contacts between the agency and the firms).
This process may involve discrete prior consultation between the firms
and the agency regarding the size or timing of a proposed rate increase
or the site for a proposed power plant, and may also include moral suasion
regarding such matters as service quality or executive salaries. This paper
by Joskow points to the price reductions filed by many New York State
electric utilities during the 1960s—in the absence of formal regulatory
reviews or other overt legal acts by the regulatory commissions—as the
result of moral suasion and behind-the-scenes bargaining between the
staffs of the commissions and the firms concerned. This informal regula-
tory process represents an attempt to short-circuit many of the time-
consuming due-process procedures of American regulatory institutions.
Commissions view such ongoing informal activities as being necessary if
they are to perform their tasks efficiently. Commission staffs seem to
believe that many of the formal legal procedures waste time without
altering any of the final outcomes, and that the informal regulatory process
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respect to the desirability of informal regulatory processes, it must be
said that in many cases they are extremely important for understanding
both agency behavior and the behavior and performance of regulated
firms.
Viewing regulatory commissions as organizations and concentrating
on the process of regulatory decisionmaking gives useful insights into
what is actually happening. The attempts to model and understand regu-
lation from this perspective often give researchers a more complete
static and dynamic structural model of regulation rather than just a
reduced form. For those interested in incremental policy reform within the
context of prevailing institutions as well as exploring possible institutional
alternatives, such structural models are extremely useful for positive
policy analysis.
Experiments
The above discussion of unsolved problems in the economics of informa-
tion and in disequilibrium price dynamics referred to several studies that
used small-group experiments to generate data and test hypotheses in
these areas. Experimental methods have also been used to study voting
behavior, and have provided tests of theoretical propositions in social
choice theory, spatial models of political choice, and game theory.
Experimental methods are rarely used in economics and political
science; indeed, among the social sciences, only psychology contains a
well-developed subfield of experimental methods. In economics, field
experiments have been used rather extensively by government to test such
institutional innovations in social policy as the negative income tax,
school and health-insurance voucher systems, and peak-load pricing
of electricity. The advantage of field experiments is that they provide a
mechanism to test a major change in policy without imposing a major
financial or political risk on the government and without risking the
welfare of an entire target population. The disadvantages of field experi-
ments are that they are very expensive and not completely controllable.
Consequently, field experiments are bound to be controversial in both
execution and results, even though they can produce better information
than can analysis of conventional socioeconomic data.
Except for peak-load-pricing experiments, the government has not
taken full advantage of using large-scale field experiments to test changes
in regulatory policies. Reform, relaxation, and even repeal of regulatory
constraints have become more popular in the past few years, but actual
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problem or fears that expectations about the effects of a change in policy
might be incorrect. A potentially useful intermediate stage in the process
of changing regulatory policy that could overcome these problems is a
series of field experiments, designed and evaluated by economists, to
test new and less restrictive forms of regulation. For example, the FCC
might deregulate cable television in a few markets, offering compensation
(should it prove necessary) to local broadcasters if their stations became
economically unviable; or a large city might deregulate taxi service in
one section of town; or a state regulatory commission might select a few
telephone exchanges in which to experiment with a new form of usage-
sensitive pricing of telecommunications services. These and numerous
other possibilities might serve an important political function in reforming
regulation, as well as providing exciting research opportunities for the
economists who would be involved in them.
Except in the case of field experiments, economists normally rely on
others (government, firms, etc.) to collect and to aggregate their data.
This limits the scope of research in numerous ways: Data are often
thoroughly contaminated; all of the economic influences that produce
the observed results cannot be measured or controlled for purposes of
estimating partial effects, and certain types of questions cannot be asked
or must be examined indirectly because the most relevant data are not
collected.
Laboratory experiments provide an opportunity to control a decision-
making environment so that the researcher can generate the kinds of data
that are most closely related to the behavioral hypothesis to be tested.
V. Smith (1977) detailed the precepts of useful labortory experiments.
One is the notion of induced preferences: The experimenter can finesse
much of the problem of differences in tastes among subjects by building
strong monetary incentives into the experiment. Another is the idea of
parallelism: An experiment should contain all of the potentially important
structural features of a real-world decisionmaking institution.
Faithful adherence to these and other precepts of good experimental
design are difficult to follow, and a potential entrant into this domain of
research can expect to experience considerable frustration in discovering
the pitfalls of laboratory experimentation. Nevertheless, the potential
payoffs are considerable. First, laboratory experiments permit generation
of data that are not observable if one is restricted to the records of real-
world market transactions. Bargains and rejected offers can be observed,
and the experimenter can determine the amount of information, the risk
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The richer scope of available data and the controllability of factors that
are normally unmeasurable in real transactions expands the range of
testable hypotheses. Second, laboratory experiments allow the researcher
to test the comparative efficiency of institutional arrangements, including
arrangements that do not exist in the real world, with other influences
held constant. This can have great practical importance to decisionmakers
because it allows them to gather information about a proposed institu-
tional change, much as field experiments do, but with greater controll-
ability and lower cost.
Several examples of the second use of experiments have emerged.
V. Smith (1977) reported a series of auction experiments that pretested
a mechanism that was later adopted by a major corporation and by the
French government for marketing bonds. Ferejohn et al. (1979) used
experimental procedures to pretest for the Public Broadcasting Service
some proposed changes in the mechanism used to acquire television
programs. Hong and Plott (1977) used experiments to provide the De-
partment of Transportation with an evaluation of proposed changes in
the rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission with regard to the
advance posting of price changes in the barge industry.
Experimental methods could provide important new information in
several areas. They could be used to generate information and to test
hypotheses concerning individual behavior with incomplete information
(experiments have already begun to bear fruit in this area). Another is in
testing regulatory interventions that are designed to change the amount
and type of information that is available to participants in a market.
Another is to extend V. Smith's pioneering efforts to compare the per-
formance of different forms of market institutions according to the type
and form of communication that is allowed among buyers and sellers.
Still another is to test alternative mechanism for dealing with external
effects, an issue that Plott (1977) explored in a preliminary fashion. The
list goes on; we recommend V. Smith's intriguing 1977 survey as a more
complete and very interesting defense of the forecast of an important role
for experimental methods in applied economics.
Extensions of Traditional Lines of Research
Having presented some perspectives on possible lines of future research
that counsel economists to work on the frontiers of microeconomic
theory, economic models of political behavior, organization theory,
experimental methods, and even some parts of psychology, we hasten to
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there remain many opportunities for interesting research in the vein of
studies discussed in the first section above. We will expand on some of
these opportunities here.
Numerous regulated industries (particularly those regulated by state
and local governments) have not been studied empirically at all. One
potentially important area for regulatory research is the medical-care
sector, which consumes nearly 10 percent of the GNP. Since 1970, nearly
all of the states have begun to regulate some aspect of the delivery of
health care services (usually, prices and/or entry in the hospital industry).
Because hospitals have local markets, and because the timing and form
of regulation differ among the states, opportunities abound for examining
the effects of various types of regulatory rules and the overall effect of
regulation. Moreover, because the move toward regulation is recent,
scholars have better and more reliable sources of information on the
political economy of regulation: the motives and behavior of political
actors in setting up these institutions. A thorough, comparative study of
hospital regulation in the United States would be a major contribution
to the literature.
We anticipate substantial new studies that will evaluate the effects of
safety regulation more thoroughly than anything that can be found now
in the literature. The form this research will take is extensive studies of
the regulation of a particular hazard, like Peltzman's (1976) study of
automobile safety. Most of the data for these analyses are available from
governmental agencies; the NEISS data from the Consumer Product
Safety Commission are one example. Added comprehensiveness will be
achieved by attempts to account for the effects of regulation in more
sophisticated, multiple-equation models of demand and costs in the
regulated industry. We doubt, however, that econometric techniques will
be refined enough to succeed in generating uncontroversial conclusions
about the magnitudes of the effects of these regulations.
Substantial research opportunities using traditional theoretical and
empirical techniques remain in agriculture and in such areas of the finan-
cial sector as banking, insurance, and securities. These sectors have largely
been ignored by regulatory economists, and are ripe for additional re-
search. Contrary to the elementary textbook concept, agriculture is sub-
ject to a wide variety of price, production, and entry regulations for specific
commodities. In addition, the administration of these regulations appears
to be considerably different from that which characterizes traditional
regulatory commissions. In financial markets, differences in regulation
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banking regulation (such as the allowance of interest payments on demand
deposits) are worthy of further study, as are the effects of open competition
in the property- and liability-insurance markets and the elimination of
fixed minimum commissions in the securities industry. Similarly, as more
states relax restrictions on advertising by professional groups and ease
entry requirements, additional information should be available to assess
the effects of professional licensure and other restrictions on competition
in service industries.
Most of the empirical literature on regulation focuses entirely on U.S.
industries. Little effort has been made to exploit available data on the
costs, prices, quality, and rate of technological change in the same indus-
tries in other developed countries. In much the same way as comparisons
between publicly and privately owned electric utilities in the U.S. have
sought to expand our understanding of the effects of government regu-
lation, comparisons across countries may provide an opportunity to
evaluate a more diverse menu of institutional alternatives.
Finally, the tendency of existing empirical work to focus on questions
of aggregate economic efficiency has caused the distributional con-
sequences of regulatory policy to be largely ignored. This is quite surpris-
ing in light of the fact that all theories of regulation indicate that the
distribution of the costs and benefits of regulation are important. As a
result, economists have had relatively little to say about a set of issues
that are of considerable concern to legislators, regulators, and the public.
In much the same way as economists who study taxation have examined
the distributional consequences of various tax schemes, regulatory
economists could obtain similar types of research results from existing
data. Such analyses do not require that scholars identify the "right"
income distribution, but will allow us to provide information that will
be useful in understanding regulation itself and in explicating the con-
sequences of regulatory reforms. Virtually every industry that has been
the subject of regulatory research is a candidate for further work directed
at identifying the distributional consequences of existing regulatory
policies and regulatory reform proposals.
Conclusion
The past twenty years has been a watershed for the study of government
regulation by economists. Modern theoretical and empirical techniques
have been brought to bear on the effects of government regulation in a
wide range of industries. Although useful incremental additions toJoskow and Noll 58
knowledge in the traditional areas of government regulation are likely
to be forthcoming through traditional analytical techniques, it is our
belief that the greatest opportunities lie in areas in which the traditional
modes of theoretical and empirical analysis are not likely to be as pro-
ductive as they have been in the past. The future direction for research that
we envision involves the utilization of new theoretical and empirical
techniques and a change in emphasis. With regard to techniques, we see
information economics, disequilibrium price dynamics, models of
political and organizational processes, and the use of large- and small-
scale experiments as playing important roles in regulatory research. With
regard to emphasis, we see further analyses of the incidence of govern-
ment regulation (rather than its global-efficiency properties) and an
effort to understand how regulation can be made to perform a wide variety
of tasks better (rather than whether these tasks are legitimate or not) as
targets of opportunity. Furthermore, we see these new directions not as
independent of, or replacements for, the important research that has
already been done, but as serving to build upon and expand what is
already known. However, we do believe that economists know a lot less
about government regulation than is sometimes thought, and that a
large amount of important research remains to be done.
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Alfred E. Kahn
Reading this excellent paper, after more than eight years of absence from
the academic economics profession, produced in me an extraordinary
variety of reactions—the most prominent was envy. Evidently one either
thinks systematically about the phenomenon of regulation, or one prac-
tices it; it seems impossible to do both.
So I will have to confine myself to remarking on the portions of this
admirable survey, at once encyclopedic and incisive, on which my own
recent regulatory experiences have some bearing.
You will understand why I find so congenial Joskow's and Noll's
general proposition "that far too much of the effort of economists has
been directed toward asking whether there should or should not be
regulation, and far too little effort directed at how to improve the per-
formance of regulatory policies"—all too congenial, since of course it
describes exactly what I have been trying to do during the last several years.
At the same time, I'm not sure I agree with them. The contribution of
the economists who have questioned what seemed to be self-evident
cases for regulation has been at least as important as the contribution of
those of us who have been trying to make it work better. If I were asked
to offer one single piece of advice to would-be regulators, on the basis
of my own experience, it is that as they perform their every single regu-
latory action they ask themselves: "Why am I doing this? Is it really
necessary?"
Still, I agree enthusiastically with the view that economists can make an
important contribution in helping regulators perform at minimum eco-
nomic cost the tasks that legislators have ordered them to perform. Let
me cite a few examples:
• Congress is determined to see to it that more air transportation
service is available than an unregulated market would provide to
relatively small and isolated communities, over relatively thinly traveled
routes; and congressmen are willing to allot as much as $100 million a
year of tax money for this purpose. There is no point in my fighting
that basic policy, particularly when some case can be made for it on
grounds of the external benefits of linking the country together and
avoiding even greater urban congestion. But what the Civil Aeronautics
Board can do and has done is explain to Congress how it may get whatComment on Joskow and Noll 67
it wants more efficiently, first, by permitting free entry of air taxis and
commuter airlines (which can perform these particular services much
more efficiently than the certificated carriers), and, second, by
developing a plan for specifying the subsidized services we want to
purchase and attempting to purchase them at minimum cost (if possible,
by competitive bids) rather than, as under the present system, essentially
by making good the revenue deficiencies of the carriers certificated for
this purpose. (This description does less than justice to the progressive
efforts by the Board over the years to refine the methods of subsidy
determination, but it will have to suffice.)
• Similarly, legislators seem determined that basic telephone service be
provided at less than long-run marginal cost, and (even worse from the
efficiency standpoint) through a system of internal subsidization. There
is plenty of opportunity, however, within the constraints of that general
legislative decision, for careful consideration of what exactly constitutes
the "basic service" that is worth subsidizing (should it, for example,
include the opportunity to make unlimited local calls, of unlimited
duration, at no extra charge; or, at the other extreme, should it embrace
only the opportunity to receive unlimited numbers of calls?), and how
this subsidy can be provided with minimum distortion.
• In pricing electricity and gas, we need help in devising practicable
methods of reconciling marginal-cost pricing with the revenue
constraint.
• Another pressing regulatory problem on which we need help is in
devising rules that make reasonable economic sense for the regulation
of competition between what appear to be natural monopolies (such as
the national telecommunications networks and specialized common
carriers), or between still partially regulated members of a cartel (for
example, the International Air Transport Association and operators of
charters.)
• A much narrower but nevertheless extremely challenging problem is
assessing the workability of competition in the performance of the
retailing function in the travel industry—specifically, assessing the
possible desirability of leaving the determination of travel agents'
commissions to the free play of competition. This problem is made
particularly challenging, and possibly even unsolvable, by the fact that
that competition may still, under regulation or international
cartelization, be highly imperfect.
• Charting the path from cartel-like regulation, such as the CAB has
practiced in the past, to a liberalization and freer play of market forces,
which we are (if only for polical reasons) inescapably committed to
taking gradually, may be more than challenging. It may well be
impossible to shepherd through gradual deregulation, without giving
deregulation itself a bad name, an industry that has grown up in a
hothouse of protectionism, is subject to the most extraordinarilyKahn 68
complicated spiderweb of restrictions carried over from the past, and
will continue to be shot through with monopoly power—all this under
the watchful eyes of 535 congressmen, each of them watching with a
hawk's eye the quality of air service available to every community in
his district.
(As I read these remarks from the perspective of February 1980,1 am
impressed with how rapidly the changes have come during the few inter-
vening months. It has obviously been possible to move to virtual deregula-
tion of the airlines; the market has proved to be a remarkably effective
regulator; and the industry, despite its 40 years in a hothouse, has proved
remarkably resilient. And the results have been good. It now looks as
though we are on the verge of similarly dramatic changes in motor-carrier
regulation. And while we are still grappling in common-carrier com-
munications with the problem of how to maintain effective competition
among companies with varying degrees of monopoly power, it appears
we are on the verge of devising essentially nonregulatory solutions
[separate subsidiaries, and requirements of equal and nondiscriminatory
access to monopoly facilities] that will permit a breaking down of 45-year-
old market barriers (for example, between computers, data processing,
and communications; between satellite and cable transmission; between
cable TV and telephony) that no longer have any technological justifica-
tion, and a genuine opening up of the entire technology to competitive
exploitation.)
There are, in short, almost unlimited opportunities for intellectually
exciting efforts to apply economic logic to concrete regulatory problems,
which are just as promising of success as the efforts to which Joskow
and Noll rightly refer in the field of variable pricing, particularly of
electricity (a success they correctly attribute to the fact that so many
economists have been willing to combine theoretical and empirical re-
search with involvement in practical application). If only because this is
a field that has heretofore been the almost exclusive preserve of lawyers,
accountants, and engineers, there is wide room for the application of
economic logic. The rewards, I guarantee, will include a very satisfying—
although almost certainly misleading—sense of accomplishment.
It is well not to delude ourselves that these accomplishments, however
gratifying, are significant in some macrocosmic sense. On the contrary,
it is terribly important that the economist-regulator not take himself
excessively seriously. I have had many occasions to observe, mainly toComment on Joskow and Noll 69
myself, that some of what I have considered my most creative efforts of
the last several years (emulating, I thought, Thurman Arnold, who after
characterizing the antitrust laws as part of the "folklore of capitalism"
undertook the job of Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust with
unprecedented vigor) were merely compensations for distortions attri-
butable to the institution of regulated monopoly itself. Let me illustrate
briefly:
• Certainly one of my proudest accomplishments was to induce the
utility companies I regulated to introduce marginal-cost-related prices,
particularly prices embodying peak responsibility principles. Time and
again, I had occasion to ask myself why the companies needed pressure
from me to do this. Why, particularly in a period of inflation, would
an electric company insist on continuously subsidizing sales of
electricity on peak, when the result was to add more to its costs than its
revenues and to intensify the financial squeeze to which it was in any
event being exposed by the combination of inflation and regulatory lag?
And why did they have to be forced to reconsider their traditional
declining block rates, when it appeared, particularly at times of peak
demand, that sales in the ultimate blocks were markedly below
marginal cost?
Two important elements of the explanation, I think, must have been
bureaucratic inertia and a lingering assumption that it was in their
interest to promote additional sales that require additional investment,
for the familiar Averch-Johnson reasons. But both of these phenomena
are themselves surely the consequence of regulated monopoly—the
first of the absence of competition and of regulation on a cost-plus basis,
the latter the familiar consequence of basing allowable returns on
invested capital. So a plausible case can be made that all this furious
activity to reform utility rate structures was itself necessitated by the
fact of regulation itself. Unregulated monopolists, lacking a reserve
margin of unexploited monopoly power that they could tap only by
expanding their rate bases, would presumably have no interest in
encouraging sales whose marginal costs exceed their price.
• Similar observations apply, I think, to my efforts to introduce various
kinds of management efficiency audits, in an attempt to overcome the
familiar defects of cost-plus regulation, or to force surprisingly
reluctant separate gas and electric companies to engage in more
comprehensive integration of their investment and operations.
Unregulated monopolists, it would seem, would have every incentive
to buy rather than produce for themselves whenever the marginal costs
of buying were less than those of producing.
• I cannot refrain from citing one last example—one in which I took
particular pride, but one which illustrates even more clearly than the
others the point I am making here. From time to time, we at the New
York Public Service Commission found ourselves confronted withKahn 70
requests by small water companies for rate increases in the range of
200 to 300 percent, which, to our astonishment, our staff testified were
necessary to enable them to cover their costs and provide a reasonable
return on investment. It was very difficult to believe, in these cases, that
costs had increased by percentages of that order of magnitude during
the period in which the then-current rates had been in effect.
The explanation was not hard to find. Though the companies in
question were separate legal and accounting entities, they either were or
had been appendages of real estate developers, who got into the water
business because most of their customers were unwilling to buy
developed lots and houses without an attached water supply. Whatever
they earned, they earned not on the water system as such but on the
combined operation. Now they were proposing to make the water
operation compensatory by conventional regulatory standards.
It proved fairly simple to explicate the sense of injustice expressed by
some of their indignant customers. The price that purchasers had paid
for the developed lots or houses must have reflected, explicitly or
implicitly, the price they were being charged for water, and certain
expectations about its future course. It seems a reasonable assumption
that the purchasers had no reason to expect their water rates to go up
more than costs. If that assumption is correct, the inference is
inescapable that to grant a water company associated with a real-estate
developer a rate increase of more than the amount by which costs had
increased since the time of purchase would as a matter of economic fact
have involved permitting a double recovery of the orginal investment—
once in the selling prices of the houses, and the second time, by courtesy
of the New York Public Service Commission, in the price of the water
itself.
The solution we developed was to require applicants for rate increases
to justify them in terms of the increases in costs they had incurred over
some reasonable period in the recent past. This involved establishing a
presumption that when the rate increases justified by the rate base/rate
of return criterion exceeded those demonstrated cost increases, the
differences were ipso facto evidence of an attempted double recovery. To
put it another way, to the extent water suppliers had been content for
some substantial period with rates that were "noncompensatory" by
traditional regulatory criteria, that constituted prima facie evidence that
some portion of the capital dedicated to providing water had already
been recovered in the sale prices of the lots and houses. This was a
satisfying application of simple economic logic, but one that would have
been unnecessary in an unregulated market.
I do not mean by these observations to imply that all such regulation
is unnecessary. Like Professors Joskow and Noll, I find that an intellec-
tually intriguing question, but not one to which I want to devote my major
efforts—fully recognizing that I may be behaving a little like a rat in aComment on Joskow and Noll 71
revolving wheel cage. The fact is that suppliers of water may have very
substantial reserves of monopoly power, to which consumers are un-
willing to be subjected without what appears to them the protection of a
regulatory commission.
I should like, in closing, to call attention to one generalization derived
from empirical economic research that has proved extremely useful in
confronting some of the regulatory problems that now confront me.
Research on cartels has demonstrated in many contexts the tendency
of collusive price-fixing to inflate costs: If prices are not free to move
down to marginal costs and there is a will to compete, marginal costs will
increase to the level of price. The airline industry under regulation has
become a familiar illustration of this tendency, which J. M. Clark (Com-
petition as a Dynamic Process [Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
1961], pp. 252-257) termed "product inflation," a phenomenon that he
perceived in some unregulated but highly concentrated markets. Its most
striking manifestation has been competitive overscheduling of flights,
which has produced an equilibrium of high fares, low load factors, and
consequently high unit costs. I have analyzed product inflation as a
possible reflection of the "tyranny of small decisions" [Kyklos XIX
(1966): 39-44], and observed the more general phenomenon of the up-
ward adjustment of cost to an artificially sustained price in my "Combined
Effects of Prorationing, the Depletion Allowance and Import Quotas on
the Cost of Producing Crude Oil in the United States" {National Resources
X(1970): 53-61]).
This observation has an interesting corollary for regulatory policy: If
a cartel-maintained price induces cost-inflating competition in service,
then an active regulatory agency can control service quality and costs by
an active low-price policy. (I recognize here, as elsewhere, that unregu-
lated competition could do the job without the help of regulation; but
that alternative is only partially available to me.) The Civil Aeronautics
Board, therefore, has shifted its policy toward discount fares from dis-
couragement to active encouragement, recognizing that if only the offerers
are prevented from recouping any resultant net revenue losses by raising
their regular fares correspondingly, the effect of the discounts is to raise
the airlines' break-even load factors. The encouragement of discount
fares, therefore, under suitable safeguards, pushes the carriers toward a
new equilibrium of lower average yields, reduced scheduling, higher load
factors, and consequently lower average costs.
In short, the observations issuing from economic research, which have
been fairly clearly established in the airline field, suggest a very useful toolKahn 72
of regulatory policy itself—a tool, however, like most of the others I have
mentioned, that proves helpful as a means of offsetting or correcting the
deficiencies in industrial performance caused by regulation itself!
On that note, combining enthusiasm and skeptical self-deprecation, it
seems fitting to close.Comment
George J. Stigler
Joskow and Noll begin their interesting and useful survey of the literature
of regulation by carefully avoiding any discussion of what regulation is.
I may unintentionally demonstrate with the following remarks that theirs
was an eminently wise decision.
Regulation on its face refers to an attempt by the state to use its legal
powers to direct the conduct—in our context, especially the economic
conduct—of nongovernmental bodies. (Indeed, as James Q. Wilson and
Patricia Rachal ["Can the Government Regulate Itself," The Public In-
terest 46 [1977]: 3-14] argue with considerable persuasiveness, the one
thing governmental regulators surely cannot regulate is other govern-
mental bodies.) Once this is said, it becomes apparent that public regula-
tion covers the entire interface of public-private relations and includes,
besides such old-fashioned fields as public utilities and antitrust policy,
the following:
• all public interventions in the resources markets (land use, capital-
mobilizing institutions, and labor),
• all money-raising activities of government, except possibly printing
money, and those disbursements that do not take the form of purchases
in open markets, and
• all public interventions in the production, sale, or purchase of goods
and services.
Public regulation therefore includes most of public finance, large parts
of monetary and financial economics and international trade, large sectors
of labor economics, agricultural and land economics, and welfare eco-
nomics. Indeed, welfare economics may be defined as that branch of
economic theory in which one economist achieves fame by demonstrating
a flaw in the price system and a second economist achieves equal fame
by discovering the flaw in this demonstration.
Joskow's and Noll's most surprising omission is the economics of legal
institutions. If the economic theory of contracts (on which Joskow has
written), torts, and property, for example, are not part of the theory of
regulation, I don't know where in economics this work belongs. Perhaps
I should marvel more at the mysteries of modern communication: Cam-
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of communication, I must emphasize, are not on the question of desirable
public policy, where on the whole the differences among the three cities
appear to be negligible. Rather, the difference is on what are the exciting
and important frontiers of research.
Can this vast array of public policies be usefully viewed as a single
subject? That is a question that is not answerable by a statement from
Joskow and Noll or me or someone else. It is answerable in the affirmative
if it can be shown that there is sufficient commonality, in the sources and
purposes of regulation, in the techniques that are used, and in the prob-
lems that are encountered, to make it useful to analyze all these phenomena
en masse.
If Joskow and Noll have succeeded in distinguishing in their survey
the important themes in the recent literature of regulation, then we can
say that the emergence of a specialization of economists in regulation
lies well in the future. If, as they believe, the main topics of our literature
have been
• regulation of competitive activities (a largely normative subject in
their treatment),
• regulation of monopolistic activities (also a largely normative subject,
still reeling from an orgy of A-J effects),
• peak-load pricing, and
• a miscellany of producer and consumer-protection laws (again,
normatively considered),
then it is amply clear that we have not found a central theoretical scheme
on which to hang our researches on regulation.
My conjecture is that if a distinguishable intellectual discipline of reg-
ulation is to appear, it will be necessary to formulate our theories in terms
of phenomena inherent in the regulatory process. Two of these phenom-
ena are the pervasive control over entry into regulated fields and the
peculiar nature of the decisionmaking process in political life (in which,
contrary to the cliches of the day, the one thing we are sure of is that each
man does not have one vote). I am persuaded that it will be found useful
to use the same theory to explain tariffs, controls over energy industries,
minimum-wage laws, environmental controls, OSHA, and the structure
of the tax system. But this is still only a hope, and we shall see.
I shall make only two comments on the details of Joskow's and Noll's
survey of the four main topics they select: regulation of competitive in-
dustries, regulation of monopoly, variable pricing, and the collection of
protective laws. The first comment is that they make quite a point of the
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changes can take place in other variables, such as quality of product or
service, which substantially alter the outcome from what a simpler theory
would predict. I commend to them and to you the work of Yoram Barzel,
especially "An Alternative Approach to the Analysis of Taxation" {Jour-
nal of Political Economy 84 [1976]: 1177-1197). Barzel has generalized
the problem of quality change and applied it fruitfully to the oil import
quota system and other problems.
My second comment concerns the strong interest Joskow and Noll
display in some recent work in price theory, with special reference to
stochastic demands and costs, and experimental studies. I must confess
that I do not see the special connection between this work and the theory
of regulation. Every topic in price theory has implications for regulation,
and I assmue that it is only the accident of their own tastes that led Joskow
and Noll not to give equal attention to the regulatory problems posed by
the theory of rational expectations or the theory of demand-revealing
processes.
If I were asked to name the most striking change in the literature of
public regulation in the past two decades, I would have chosen not the
changes in techniques of analysis but a fundamental change that has
occurred in the questions that are asked of regulation: Before 1960 there
were extraordinarily few occasions on which anyone asked: Can we es-
timate empirically the effects of a public policy? The prevalent practice
was to appraise the regulatory policy on general theoretical grounds (the
standard analysis of monopoly is a leading example), or to judge the
policies by an intensive legal-administrative survey of the administering
body (Sharfman's volumes on the ICC are the prototype of this approach,
which of course still rules in the political science literature). If one wishes
to document the prevalent normative, nonquantitative approach to reg-
ulation before 1960, he can go to the encyclopedic textbooks—above all,
to Clair Wilcox's Public Policies Toward Business (Homewood, 111.: Irwin,
1955), but also to the slightly earlier Government and Economic Life by
L. S. Lyon et al. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1939-1940)
or to the Twentieth Century Fund series.
The consequences of this shift of inquiry have been profound. The
shift of focus revealed that the conventional theory of most regulatory
policies was incomplete when it was not grossly superficial. When one
did not find appreciable regulatory effects in the direction indicated by
the preamble to the regulatory policy there was a strong stimulus to look
elsewhere, on the not unreasonable ground that public policies are not
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although in my own case the inevitable required ten years to be recognized
—was that questions began to be asked as to why we were regulating the
activities that we were, and to what ends. These questions lead to an
entirely different orientation of the theory of regulation.
One of the main results of this reorientation was the emergence of the
beginnings of a theory of regulation: the theory of what regulations will
be instituted, and in whose behalf. Joskow and Noll discuss this literature
briefly in a manner I find difficult to follow. Part of my difficulty arises
because they mix the basic question with another that I consider minor
and almost independent, namely, whether it is legislatures or their bureau-
cratic agents who control regulatory events. They apparently consider
it a decisive criticism against the theory of regulation that it does not
contain a complete theory of politically effective coalitions; that, at least,
is the sense I can read into their complaints at tautological tests of the
theory. I only wish the tautological tests had come out better.
To complain at the insufficiency of the work—which after all is only
about six years old—in this area is only proper, for on neither theoretical
nor empirical sides do we have a mature, confident theory. But Joskow
and Noll appear to miss the basic point of the theory of regulation: It
poses a fundamental and inescapable problem. If one cannot explain why
some regulations appear and some regulations do not appear, one simply
cannot deal with the fundamental questions of regulation. Unless I know
why New York City has rent controls, I do not know what questions to
ask about their effects, what alternative policies are compatible with the
coalition strengths that underlie the present rent controls, and where and
when rent controls will spread. The theory of regulation is essentially a
non-normative theory, and it is possible that Joskow's and Noll's lack
of sympathy with it is due to this fact. Certainly the overwhelmingly
dominant interest of their paper is in normative questions, which they
seldom neglect for even a page.
Joskow and Noll are good enough to devote the last third of their pages
to telling us what to work on in the future. On its face this is extraordin-
arily self-sacrificial behavior: Promising ideas are all that even a rich
scholar possesses, and here they are giving away their wealth. Or can it
be that these proposed lines of research are not worth their time, but are
perhaps worth ours? Rather than pursue the economics of scholarly
advice, let me simply say that I have always thought that revealed pref-
erence is the only reliable guide to what a scholar believes to be fruitful
research problems: If he doesn't work on them, he provides no reason
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Their advice is not all that surprising. They tell us that more work
should be done on the economics of information; this is about equivalent
to telling college students that just because the pill is available is no reason
to forget about sex. A second recommended topic for study is economic
dynamics. Dynamics is an indispensable item on every list of desirable
researches, although its urgency is perhaps less in the context of regulatory
processes, which are what economists have in mind when they refer to
the long run. A third proposal is that we share the Caltech interest in
experimental economics, with which I concur, although the topic is almost
conclusive proof that everything in economics has some connection with
regulation.
They also commend varied and detailed study of the political and ad-
ministrative processes. Of course they are right, but I wish their sugges-
tions had been grounded in economic theory instead of reading like the
traditional literature of political science.
It is easy to make legitimate points of complaint against a survey of an
immense and unsystematic literature, no matter who is making that survey.
A literature can be systematized and appraised only when it reaches a
period of comparative consensus and hence stability. In the midst of a
period of rapid development, varied experimental explorations, and con-
siderable controversy, a survey is inherently incomplete and short-visioned
and even exparte. It is indicative of the ambiguity of the current literature
that Joskow and Noll devote almost all of their pages to what are really
questions of allocational efficiency, whereas if I had been making the
survey I would have devoted a large share of the pages to the income-
redistribution aspects of regulation. The proper time to survey the liter-
ature of regulation, I propose, is after the subject is developed.